update: teach hg to override untracked dir with a tracked file on update
This is a fix to an old problem when Mercurial got confused by an
untracked folder with the same name as one of the files in a commit
hg was trying to update to. It is pretty safe to remove this folder if
it is empty. Backing up an empty folder seems to go against Mercurial's
"don't track dirs" philosophy.
# sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial
#
# Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
# Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <alexis@cecm.usp.br>
# Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <vadim.gelfer@gmail.com>
#
# This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
# GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.
from __future__ import absolute_import
import hashlib
import os
import re
import ssl
import sys
from .i18n import _
from . import (
error,
util,
)
# Python 2.7.9+ overhauled the built-in SSL/TLS features of Python. It added
# support for TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, SNI, system CA stores, etc. These features are
# all exposed via the "ssl" module.
#
# Depending on the version of Python being used, SSL/TLS support is either
# modern/secure or legacy/insecure. Many operations in this module have
# separate code paths depending on support in Python.
hassni = getattr(ssl, 'HAS_SNI', False)
try:
OP_NO_SSLv2 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2
OP_NO_SSLv3 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3
except AttributeError:
OP_NO_SSLv2 = 0x1000000
OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x2000000
try:
# ssl.SSLContext was added in 2.7.9 and presence indicates modern
# SSL/TLS features are available.
SSLContext = ssl.SSLContext
modernssl = True
_canloaddefaultcerts = util.safehasattr(SSLContext, 'load_default_certs')
except AttributeError:
modernssl = False
_canloaddefaultcerts = False
# We implement SSLContext using the interface from the standard library.
class SSLContext(object):
# ssl.wrap_socket gained the "ciphers" named argument in 2.7.
_supportsciphers = sys.version_info >= (2, 7)
def __init__(self, protocol):
# From the public interface of SSLContext
self.protocol = protocol
self.check_hostname = False
self.options = 0
self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
# Used by our implementation.
self._certfile = None
self._keyfile = None
self._certpassword = None
self._cacerts = None
self._ciphers = None
def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None):
self._certfile = certfile
self._keyfile = keyfile
self._certpassword = password
def load_default_certs(self, purpose=None):
pass
def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None):
if capath:
raise error.Abort(_('capath not supported'))
if cadata:
raise error.Abort(_('cadata not supported'))
self._cacerts = cafile
def set_ciphers(self, ciphers):
if not self._supportsciphers:
raise error.Abort(_('setting ciphers not supported'))
self._ciphers = ciphers
def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False):
# server_hostname is unique to SSLContext.wrap_socket and is used
# for SNI in that context. So there's nothing for us to do with it
# in this legacy code since we don't support SNI.
args = {
'keyfile': self._keyfile,
'certfile': self._certfile,
'server_side': server_side,
'cert_reqs': self.verify_mode,
'ssl_version': self.protocol,
'ca_certs': self._cacerts,
}
if self._supportsciphers:
args['ciphers'] = self._ciphers
return ssl.wrap_socket(socket, **args)
def _hostsettings(ui, hostname):
"""Obtain security settings for a hostname.
Returns a dict of settings relevant to that hostname.
"""
s = {
# Whether we should attempt to load default/available CA certs
# if an explicit ``cafile`` is not defined.
'allowloaddefaultcerts': True,
# List of 2-tuple of (hash algorithm, hash).
'certfingerprints': [],
# Path to file containing concatenated CA certs. Used by
# SSLContext.load_verify_locations().
'cafile': None,
# Whether certificate verification should be disabled.
'disablecertverification': False,
# Whether the legacy [hostfingerprints] section has data for this host.
'legacyfingerprint': False,
# ssl.CERT_* constant used by SSLContext.verify_mode.
'verifymode': None,
}
# Look for fingerprints in [hostsecurity] section. Value is a list
# of <alg>:<fingerprint> strings.
fingerprints = ui.configlist('hostsecurity', '%s:fingerprints' % hostname,
[])
for fingerprint in fingerprints:
if not (fingerprint.startswith(('sha1:', 'sha256:', 'sha512:'))):
raise error.Abort(_('invalid fingerprint for %s: %s') % (
hostname, fingerprint),
hint=_('must begin with "sha1:", "sha256:", '
'or "sha512:"'))
alg, fingerprint = fingerprint.split(':', 1)
fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(':', '').lower()
s['certfingerprints'].append((alg, fingerprint))
# Fingerprints from [hostfingerprints] are always SHA-1.
for fingerprint in ui.configlist('hostfingerprints', hostname, []):
fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(':', '').lower()
s['certfingerprints'].append(('sha1', fingerprint))
s['legacyfingerprint'] = True
# If a host cert fingerprint is defined, it is the only thing that
# matters. No need to validate CA certs.
if s['certfingerprints']:
s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE
s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False
# If --insecure is used, don't take CAs into consideration.
elif ui.insecureconnections:
s['disablecertverification'] = True
s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE
s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False
if ui.configbool('devel', 'disableloaddefaultcerts'):
s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False
# If both fingerprints and a per-host ca file are specified, issue a warning
# because users should not be surprised about what security is or isn't
# being performed.
cafile = ui.config('hostsecurity', '%s:verifycertsfile' % hostname)
if s['certfingerprints'] and cafile:
ui.warn(_('(hostsecurity.%s:verifycertsfile ignored when host '
'fingerprints defined; using host fingerprints for '
'verification)\n') % hostname)
# Try to hook up CA certificate validation unless something above
# makes it not necessary.
if s['verifymode'] is None:
# Look at per-host ca file first.
if cafile:
cafile = util.expandpath(cafile)
if not os.path.exists(cafile):
raise error.Abort(_('path specified by %s does not exist: %s') %
('hostsecurity.%s:verifycertsfile' % hostname,
cafile))
s['cafile'] = cafile
else:
# Find global certificates file in config.
cafile = ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
if cafile:
cafile = util.expandpath(cafile)
if not os.path.exists(cafile):
raise error.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') %
cafile)
else:
# No global CA certs. See if we can load defaults.
cafile = _defaultcacerts()
if cafile:
ui.debug('using %s to enable OS X system CA\n' % cafile)
s['cafile'] = cafile
# Require certificate validation if CA certs are being loaded and
# verification hasn't been disabled above.
if cafile or (_canloaddefaultcerts and s['allowloaddefaultcerts']):
s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
else:
# At this point we don't have a fingerprint, aren't being
# explicitly insecure, and can't load CA certs. Connecting
# is insecure. We allow the connection and abort during
# validation (once we have the fingerprint to print to the
# user).
s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE
assert s['verifymode'] is not None
return s
def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, serverhostname=None):
"""Add SSL/TLS to a socket.
This is a glorified wrapper for ``ssl.wrap_socket()``. It makes sane
choices based on what security options are available.
In addition to the arguments supported by ``ssl.wrap_socket``, we allow
the following additional arguments:
* serverhostname - The expected hostname of the remote server. If the
server (and client) support SNI, this tells the server which certificate
to use.
"""
if not serverhostname:
raise error.Abort(_('serverhostname argument is required'))
settings = _hostsettings(ui, serverhostname)
# Despite its name, PROTOCOL_SSLv23 selects the highest protocol
# that both ends support, including TLS protocols. On legacy stacks,
# the highest it likely goes in TLS 1.0. On modern stacks, it can
# support TLS 1.2.
#
# The PROTOCOL_TLSv* constants select a specific TLS version
# only (as opposed to multiple versions). So the method for
# supporting multiple TLS versions is to use PROTOCOL_SSLv23 and
# disable protocols via SSLContext.options and OP_NO_* constants.
# However, SSLContext.options doesn't work unless we have the
# full/real SSLContext available to us.
#
# SSLv2 and SSLv3 are broken. We ban them outright.
if modernssl:
protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23
else:
protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1
# TODO use ssl.create_default_context() on modernssl.
sslcontext = SSLContext(protocol)
# This is a no-op on old Python.
sslcontext.options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 | OP_NO_SSLv3
# This still works on our fake SSLContext.
sslcontext.verify_mode = settings['verifymode']
if certfile is not None:
def password():
f = keyfile or certfile
return ui.getpass(_('passphrase for %s: ') % f, '')
sslcontext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, password)
if settings['cafile'] is not None:
try:
sslcontext.load_verify_locations(cafile=settings['cafile'])
except ssl.SSLError as e:
raise error.Abort(_('error loading CA file %s: %s') % (
settings['cafile'], e.args[1]),
hint=_('file is empty or malformed?'))
caloaded = True
elif settings['allowloaddefaultcerts']:
# This is a no-op on old Python.
sslcontext.load_default_certs()
caloaded = True
else:
caloaded = False
try:
sslsocket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=serverhostname)
except ssl.SSLError:
# If we're doing certificate verification and no CA certs are loaded,
# that is almost certainly the reason why verification failed. Provide
# a hint to the user.
# Only modern ssl module exposes SSLContext.get_ca_certs() so we can
# only show this warning if modern ssl is available.
if (caloaded and settings['verifymode'] == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED and
modernssl and not sslcontext.get_ca_certs()):
ui.warn(_('(an attempt was made to load CA certificates but none '
'were loaded; see '
'https://mercurial-scm.org/wiki/SecureConnections for '
'how to configure Mercurial to avoid this error)\n'))
raise
# check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been
# closed
# - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
if not sslsocket.cipher():
raise error.Abort(_('ssl connection failed'))
sslsocket._hgstate = {
'caloaded': caloaded,
'hostname': serverhostname,
'settings': settings,
'ui': ui,
}
return sslsocket
class wildcarderror(Exception):
"""Represents an error parsing wildcards in DNS name."""
def _dnsnamematch(dn, hostname, maxwildcards=1):
"""Match DNS names according RFC 6125 section 6.4.3.
This code is effectively copied from CPython's ssl._dnsname_match.
Returns a bool indicating whether the expected hostname matches
the value in ``dn``.
"""
pats = []
if not dn:
return False
pieces = dn.split(r'.')
leftmost = pieces[0]
remainder = pieces[1:]
wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
if wildcards > maxwildcards:
raise wildcarderror(
_('too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: %s') % dn)
# speed up common case w/o wildcards
if not wildcards:
return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
# the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
if leftmost == '*':
# When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
# fragment.
pats.append('[^.]+')
elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
# where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
# U-label of an internationalized domain name.
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
else:
# Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
# add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
for frag in remainder:
pats.append(re.escape(frag))
pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
return pat.match(hostname) is not None
def _verifycert(cert, hostname):
'''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname.
CRLs is not handled.
Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success.
'''
if not cert:
return _('no certificate received')
dnsnames = []
san = cert.get('subjectAltName', [])
for key, value in san:
if key == 'DNS':
try:
if _dnsnamematch(value, hostname):
return
except wildcarderror as e:
return e.message
dnsnames.append(value)
if not dnsnames:
# The subject is only checked when there is no DNS in subjectAltName.
for sub in cert.get('subject', []):
for key, value in sub:
# According to RFC 2818 the most specific Common Name must
# be used.
if key == 'commonName':
# 'subject' entries are unicide.
try:
value = value.encode('ascii')
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return _('IDN in certificate not supported')
try:
if _dnsnamematch(value, hostname):
return
except wildcarderror as e:
return e.message
dnsnames.append(value)
if len(dnsnames) > 1:
return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(dnsnames)
elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
return _('certificate is for %s') % dnsnames[0]
else:
return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate')
def _plainapplepython():
"""return true if this seems to be a pure Apple Python that
* is unfrozen and presumably has the whole mercurial module in the file
system
* presumably is an Apple Python that uses Apple OpenSSL which has patches
for using system certificate store CAs in addition to the provided
cacerts file
"""
if sys.platform != 'darwin' or util.mainfrozen() or not sys.executable:
return False
exe = os.path.realpath(sys.executable).lower()
return (exe.startswith('/usr/bin/python') or
exe.startswith('/system/library/frameworks/python.framework/'))
def _defaultcacerts():
"""return path to default CA certificates or None."""
if _plainapplepython():
dummycert = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'dummycert.pem')
if os.path.exists(dummycert):
return dummycert
return None
def validatesocket(sock):
"""Validate a socket meets security requiremnets.
The passed socket must have been created with ``wrapsocket()``.
"""
host = sock._hgstate['hostname']
ui = sock._hgstate['ui']
settings = sock._hgstate['settings']
try:
peercert = sock.getpeercert(True)
peercert2 = sock.getpeercert()
except AttributeError:
raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
if not peercert:
raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: '
'no certificate received') % host)
if settings['disablecertverification']:
# We don't print the certificate fingerprint because it shouldn't
# be necessary: if the user requested certificate verification be
# disabled, they presumably already saw a message about the inability
# to verify the certificate and this message would have printed the
# fingerprint. So printing the fingerprint here adds little to no
# value.
ui.warn(_('warning: connection security to %s is disabled per current '
'settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping '
'and tampering\n') % host)
return
# If a certificate fingerprint is pinned, use it and only it to
# validate the remote cert.
peerfingerprints = {
'sha1': hashlib.sha1(peercert).hexdigest(),
'sha256': hashlib.sha256(peercert).hexdigest(),
'sha512': hashlib.sha512(peercert).hexdigest(),
}
def fmtfingerprint(s):
return ':'.join([s[x:x + 2] for x in range(0, len(s), 2)])
nicefingerprint = 'sha256:%s' % fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints['sha256'])
if settings['certfingerprints']:
for hash, fingerprint in settings['certfingerprints']:
if peerfingerprints[hash].lower() == fingerprint:
ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s:%s\n' %
(host, hash, fmtfingerprint(fingerprint)))
return
# Pinned fingerprint didn't match. This is a fatal error.
if settings['legacyfingerprint']:
section = 'hostfingerprint'
nice = fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints['sha1'])
else:
section = 'hostsecurity'
nice = '%s:%s' % (hash, fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints[hash]))
raise error.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected '
'fingerprint %s') % (host, nice),
hint=_('check %s configuration') % section)
# Security is enabled but no CAs are loaded. We can't establish trust
# for the cert so abort.
if not sock._hgstate['caloaded']:
raise error.Abort(
_('unable to verify security of %s (no loaded CA certificates); '
'refusing to connect') % host,
hint=_('see https://mercurial-scm.org/wiki/SecureConnections for '
'how to configure Mercurial to avoid this error or set '
'hostsecurity.%s:fingerprints=%s to trust this server') %
(host, nicefingerprint))
msg = _verifycert(peercert2, host)
if msg:
raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg),
hint=_('set hostsecurity.%s:certfingerprints=%s '
'config setting or use --insecure to connect '
'insecurely') %
(host, nicefingerprint))