view tests/test-cache-abuse.t @ 29258:6315c1e14f75

sslutil: introduce a function for determining host-specific settings

This patch marks the beginning of a series that introduces a new,
more configurable, per-host security settings mechanism. Currently,
we have global settings (like web.cacerts and the --insecure argument).
We also have per-host settings via [hostfingerprints].

Global security settings are good for defaults, but they don't
provide the amount of control often wanted. For example, an
organization may want to require a particular CA is used for a
particular hostname.

[hostfingerprints] is nice. But it currently assumes SHA-1.
Furthermore, there is no obvious place to put additional per-host
settings.

Subsequent patches will be introducing new mechanisms for defining
security settings, some on a per-host basis. This commits starts
the transition to that world by introducing the _hostsettings
function. It takes a ui and hostname and returns a dict of security
settings. Currently, it limits itself to returning host fingerprint
info.

We foreshadow the future support of non-SHA1 hashing algorithms
for verifying the host fingerprint by making the "certfingerprints"
key a list of tuples instead of a list of hashes.

We add this dict to the hgstate property on the socket and use it
during socket validation for checking fingerprints. There should be
no change in behavior.

Enable obsolete markers

  $ cat >> $HGRCPATH << EOF
  > [experimental]
  > evolution=createmarkers
  > [phases]
  > publish=False
  > EOF

Build a repo with some cacheable bits:

  $ hg init a
  $ cd a

  $ echo a > a
  $ hg ci -qAm0
  $ hg tag t1
  $ hg book -i bk1

  $ hg branch -q b2
  $ hg ci -Am1
  $ hg tag t2

  $ echo dumb > dumb
  $ hg ci -qAmdumb
  $ hg debugobsolete b1174d11b69e63cb0c5726621a43c859f0858d7f

  $ hg phase -pr t1
  $ hg phase -fsr t2

Make a helper function to check cache damage invariants:

- command output shouldn't change
- cache should be present after first use
- corruption/repair should be silent (no exceptions or warnings)
- cache should survive deletion, overwrite, and append
- unreadable / unwriteable caches should be ignored
- cache should be rebuilt after corruption

  $ damage() {
  >  CMD=$1
  >  CACHE=.hg/cache/$2
  >  CLEAN=$3
  >  hg $CMD > before
  >  test -f $CACHE || echo "not present"
  >  echo bad > $CACHE
  >  test -z "$CLEAN" || $CLEAN
  >  hg $CMD > after
  >  diff -u before after || echo "*** overwrite corruption"
  >  echo corruption >> $CACHE
  >  test -z "$CLEAN" || $CLEAN
  >  hg $CMD > after
  >  diff -u before after || echo "*** append corruption"
  >  rm $CACHE
  >  mkdir $CACHE
  >  test -z "$CLEAN" || $CLEAN
  >  hg $CMD > after
  >  diff -u before after || echo "*** read-only corruption"
  >  test -d $CACHE || echo "*** directory clobbered"
  >  rmdir $CACHE
  >  test -z "$CLEAN" || $CLEAN
  >  hg $CMD > after
  >  diff -u before after || echo "*** missing corruption"
  >  test -f $CACHE || echo "not rebuilt"
  > }

Beat up tags caches:

  $ damage "tags --hidden" tags2
  $ damage tags tags2-visible
  $ damage "tag -f t3" hgtagsfnodes1

Beat up hidden cache:

  $ damage log hidden

Beat up branch caches:

  $ damage branches branch2-base "rm .hg/cache/branch2-[vs]*"
  $ damage branches branch2-served "rm .hg/cache/branch2-[bv]*"
  $ damage branches branch2-visible
  $ damage "log -r branch(.)" rbc-names-v1
  $ damage "log -r branch(default)" rbc-names-v1
  $ damage "log -r branch(b2)" rbc-revs-v1

We currently can't detect an rbc cache with unknown names:

  $ damage "log -qr branch(b2)" rbc-names-v1
  --- before	* (glob)
  +++ after	* (glob)
  @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
  -2:5fb7d38b9dc4
  -3:60b597ffdafa
  -4:b1174d11b69e
  -5:6354685872c0
  -6:5ebc725f1bef
  -7:7b76eec2f273
  -8:ef3428d9d644
  -9:ba7a936bc03c
  *** append corruption