Kevin Bullock <kbullock@ringworld.org> [Tue, 06 Mar 2018 13:19:54 -0600] rev 35852
Added signature for changeset 8bba684efde7
Kevin Bullock <kbullock@ringworld.org> [Tue, 06 Mar 2018 13:19:52 -0600] rev 35851
Added tag 4.5.2 for changeset 8bba684efde7
Kevin Bullock <kbullock+mercurial@ringworld.org> [Tue, 06 Mar 2018 13:17:07 -0600] rev 35850
merge with security patches
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sun, 18 Feb 2018 17:20:38 -0800] rev 35849
hgweb: always perform permissions checks on protocol commands (BC) (SEC)
Previously, the HTTP request handling code would only perform
permissions checking on a wire protocol command if that wire protocol
command defined its permissions / operation type. This meant that
commands (possibly provided by extensions) not defining their
operation type would bypass permissions check. This could lead
to exfiltration of data from servers and mutating repositories that
were supposed to be read-only.
This security issue has been present since the permissions table
was introduced by d3147b4e3e8a in 2008.
This commit changes the behavior of the HTTP server to always
perform permissions checking for protocol requests. If an
explicit permission for a wire protocol command is not defined,
the server assumes the command can be used for writing and
governs access accordingly.
.. bc::
Wire protocol commands not defining their operation type in
``wireproto.PERMISSIONS`` are now assumed to be used for
"push" operations and access control to run those commands
is now enforced accordingly.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 20 Feb 2018 18:55:58 -0800] rev 35848
wireproto: check permissions when executing "batch" command (BC) (SEC)
For as long as the "batch" command has existed (introduced by
bd88561afb4b and first released as part of Mercurial 1.9), that command
(like most wire commands introduced after 2008) lacked an entry in
the hgweb permissions table. And since we don't verify permissions if
an entry is missing from the permissions table, this meant that
executing a command via "batch" would bypass all permissions
checks.
The security implications are significant: a Mercurial HTTP server
would allow writes via "batch" wire protocol commands as long as
the HTTP request were processed by Mercurial and the process running
the Mercurial HTTP server had write access to the repository. The
Mercurial defaults of servers being read-only and the various web.*
config options to define access control were bypassed.
In addition, "batch" could be used to exfiltrate data from servers
that were configured to not allow read access.
Both forms of permissions bypass could be mitigated to some extent
by using HTTP authentication. This would prevent HTTP requests from
hitting Mercurial's server logic. However, any authenticated request
would still be able to bypass permissions checks via "batch" commands.
The easiest exploit was to send "pushkey" commands via "batch" and
modify the state of bookmarks, phases, and obsolescence markers.
However, I suspect a well-crafted HTTP request could trick the server
into running the "unbundle" wire protocol command, effectively
performing a full `hg push` to create new changesets on the remote.
This commit plugs this gaping security hole by having the "batch"
command perform permissions checking on each sub-command that is
being batched. We do this by threading a permissions checking
callable all the way to the protocol handler. The threading is a
bit hacky from a code perspective. But it preserves API compatibility,
which is the proper thing to do on the stable branch.
One of the subtle things we do is assume that a command with an
undefined permission is a "push" command. This is the safest thing to
do from a security perspective: we don't want to take chances that
a command could perform a write even though the server is configured
to not allow writes.
As the test changes demonstrate, it is no longer possible to bypass
permissions via the "batch" wire protocol command.
.. bc::
The "batch" wire protocol command now enforces permissions of
each invoked sub-command. Wire protocol commands must define
their operation type or the "batch" command will assume they
can write data and will prevent their execution on HTTP servers
unless the HTTP request method is POST, the server is configured
to allow pushes, and the (possibly authenticated) HTTP user is
authorized to perform a push.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 20 Feb 2018 18:54:27 -0800] rev 35847
wireproto: declare operation type for most commands (BC) (SEC)
The permissions model of hgweb relies on a dictionary to declare
the operation associated with each command - either "pull" or
"push." This dictionary was established by d3147b4e3e8a in 2008.
Unfortunately, we neglected to update this dictionary as new
wire protocol commands were introduced.
This commit defines the operations of most wire protocol commands
in the permissions dictionary. The "batch" command is omitted because
it is special and requires a more complex solution.
Since permissions checking is skipped unless a command has an entry in
this dictionary (this security issue will be addressed in a subsequent
commit), the practical effect of this change is that various wire
protocol commands now HTTP 401 if web.deny_read or web.allow-pull,
etc are set to deny access. This is reflected by test changes. Note
how various `hg pull` and `hg push` operations now fail before
discovery. (They fail during the initial "capabilities" request.)
This change fixes a security issue where built-in wire protocol
commands would return repository data even if the web config were
configured to deny access to that data.
I'm on the fence as to whether we should HTTP 401 the capabilities
request. On one hand, it can expose repository metadata and can tell
callers things like what version of Mercurial the server is running.
On the other hand, a client may need to know the capabilities in order
to authenticate in a follow-up request. It appears that Mercurial
clients handle the HTTP 401 on *any* protocol request, so we should
be OK sending a 401 for "capabilities." But if this causes problems,
it should be possible to allow "capabilities" to always work.
.. bc::
Various read-only wire protocol commands now return HTTP 401
Unauthorized if the hgweb configuration denies read/pull access to
the repository.
Previously, various wire protocol commands would still work and
return data if read access was disabled.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 20 Feb 2018 18:53:39 -0800] rev 35846
wireproto: move command permissions dict out of hgweb_mod
The operation type associated with wire protocol commands is supposed
to be defined in a dictionary so it can be used for permissions
checking.
Since this metadata is closely associated with wire protocol commands
themselves, it makes sense to define it in the same module where
wire protocol commands are defined.
This commit moves hgweb_mod.perms to wireproto.PERMISSIONS and
updates most references in the code to use the new home. The old
symbol remains an alias for the new symbol. Tests pass with the
code pointing at the old symbol. So this should be API compatible
for extensions.
As part of the code move, we split up the assignment to the dict
so it is next to the @wireprotocommand. This reinforces that a
@wireprotocommand should have an entry in this dict.
In the future, we'll want to declare permissions as part of the
@wireprotocommand decorator. But this isn't appropriate for the
stable branch.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 20 Feb 2018 19:09:01 -0800] rev 35845
tests: comprehensively test HTTP server permissions checking
We didn't have test coverage for numerous web.* config options. We
add that test coverage.
Included in the tests are tests for custom commands. We have commands
that are supposedly read-only and perform writes and a variation of
each that does and does not define its operation type in
hgweb_mod.perms.
The tests reveal a handful of security bugs related to permissions
checking. Subsequent commits will address these security bugs.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sun, 18 Feb 2018 10:40:49 -0800] rev 35844
tests: extract HTTP permissions tests to own test file
We're about to implement a lot more coverage of the permissions
mechanism. In preparation for that, establish a new test file
to hold permissions checks.
As part of this, we inline the important parts of the "req" helper
function.
Kevin Bullock <kbullock@ringworld.org> [Tue, 06 Mar 2018 13:08:00 -0600] rev 35843
Added signature for changeset 369aadf7a326
Kevin Bullock <kbullock@ringworld.org> [Tue, 06 Mar 2018 13:07:58 -0600] rev 35842
Added tag 4.5.1 for changeset 369aadf7a326
Jun Wu <quark@fb.com> [Tue, 13 Feb 2018 11:35:32 -0800] rev 35841
revlog: resolve lfs rawtext to vanilla rawtext before applying delta
This happens when a LFS delta base gets a non-LFS delta from another client.
In that case, the LFS delta base needs to be converted to non-LFS version
before applying the delta.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D2069
Jun Wu <quark@fb.com> [Tue, 13 Feb 2018 11:35:32 -0800] rev 35840
revlog: do not use delta for lfs revisions
This is similar to what we have done for changegroups. It is needed to make
sure the delta application code path can assume deltas are always against
vanilla (ex. non-LFS) rawtext so the next fix becomes possible.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D2068
Jun Wu <quark@fb.com> [Tue, 06 Feb 2018 19:08:25 -0800] rev 35839
changegroup: do not delta lfs revisions
There is no way to distinguish whether a delta base is LFS or non-LFS.
If the delta is against LFS rawtext, and the client trying to apply it has
the base revision stored as fulltext, the delta (aka. bundle) will fail to
apply.
This patch forbids using delta for LFS revisions in changegroup so bad
deltas won't be transmitted.
Note: this does not solve the problem entirely. It solves LFS delta applying
to non-LFS base. But the other direction: non-LFS delta applying to LFS base
is not solved yet.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D2067
Jun Wu <quark@fb.com> [Tue, 06 Feb 2018 16:08:57 -0800] rev 35838
lfs: add a test showing bundle application could be broken
When a bundle containing LFS delta uses non-LFS delta-base, or vice-versa,
the bundle will fail to apply.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D2066
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Sun, 04 Mar 2018 14:53:57 -0500] rev 35837
test-annotate: set stdin and stdout to binary to get CR unmodified
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Sun, 04 Mar 2018 13:19:05 -0500] rev 35836
test-annotate: rewrite sed with some python
I hope this will fix the test failure seen on FreeBSD and Windows.
Matt Harbison <matt_harbison@yahoo.com> [Sat, 03 Mar 2018 22:29:24 -0500] rev 35835
test-subrepo: glob away an unstable hash
This is the instability mentioned at the beginning of the series. I don't like
hiding it, but I don't want to sit on a fix for a user reported problem while
trying to figure this out.
The instability seems related to the cset with a .hgsub with a remote URL.
(There's very little existing remote URL subrepo testing.)
Matt Harbison <matt_harbison@yahoo.com> [Thu, 01 Mar 2018 11:37:00 -0500] rev 35834
subrepo: activate clone pooling to enable sharing with remote URLs
This is the easiest way to ensure that repositories with remote subrepo
references can share the subrepos, consistent with how local subrepos can be
shared.
Matt Harbison <matt_harbison@yahoo.com> [Thu, 01 Mar 2018 11:13:00 -0500] rev 35833
subrepo: don't attempt to share remote sources (issue5793)
Untangling _abssource() to resolve the new subrepo relative to the shared
parent's share path, and then either sharing from there (if it exists), or
cloning to that location and then sharing, is probably more than should be
attempted on stable. Absolute subrepo references are discouraged, so for now,
this resumes the behavior prior to 68e0bcb90357 of cloning the absolute subrepo
locally.
Matt Harbison <matt_harbison@yahoo.com> [Wed, 28 Feb 2018 00:29:27 -0500] rev 35832
test-subrepo: demonstrate problems with subrepo sharing and absolute paths
This affects remote paths in .hgsub, as well as clone pooling from a remote
source.
For reasons unknown, there are stability issues with the relative-path.t tests.
If run as a single test, it is stable. If run with --loop, or with -jX for X>1,
the hash of the parent repo changes. I'm seeing this on both Windows and Fedora
26. I added an `hg log --debug`, and the manifest hash changes, but I have no
idea why.
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Wed, 21 Feb 2018 21:14:05 +0900] rev 35831
annotate: do not poorly split lines at CR (issue5798)
mdiff and lines(text) take only LF as a line separator, but str.splitlines()
breaks our assumption. Use mdiff.splitnewlines() consistently.
It's hard to read \r in tests, so \r is replaced with [CR]. I had to wrap
sed by a shell function to silence check-code warning.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Fri, 23 Feb 2018 17:57:04 -0800] rev 35830
setup: only allow Python 3 from a source checkout (issue5804)
People are running `pip install Mercurial` with Python 3 and that
is working because not everything performs a Python version
compatibility check.
Modern versions of pip do recognize the "python_requires" keyword
(https://packaging.python.org/tutorials/distributing-packages/#python-requires)
which we set if using setuptools. But this isn't set nor recognized
everywhere.
To prevent people from accidentally installing Mercurial with Python
3 until Python 3 is officially supported, have setup.py fail when
run with Python 3. But don't fail if we're running from a source
checkout, as we don't want to anger Mercurial developers hacking
on Python 3 nor Mercurial's test automation running from source
checkouts. People running setup.py from source checkouts could still
fall through a Python 3 crack. But at least the
`pip install Mercurial` attempt will get nipped in the bud.
Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jeffpc@josefsipek.net> [Wed, 21 Feb 2018 16:51:09 -0500] rev 35829
help: fix wording describing SSH requirements