hgweb: garbage collect on every request There appears to be a cycle in localrepository or hgweb that is preventing repositories from being garbage collected when hgwebdir dispatches to hgweb. Every request creates a new repository instance and then leaks that object and other referenced objects. A periodic GC to find cycles will eventually collect the old repositories. But these don't run reliably and rapid requests to hgwebdir can result in rapidly increasing memory consumption. With the Firefox repository, repeated requests to raw-file URLs leak ~100 MB per hgwebdir request (most of this appears to be cached manifest data structures). WSGI processes quickly grow to >1 GB RSS. Breaking the cycles in localrepository is going to be a bit of work. Because we know that hgwebdir leaks localrepository instances, let's put a band aid on the problem in the form of an explicit gc.collect() on every hgwebdir request. As the inline comment states, ideally we'd do this in a finally block for the current request iff it dispatches to hgweb. But _runwsgi() returns an explicit value. We need the finally to run after generator exhaustion. So we'd need to refactor _runwsgi() to "yield" instead of "return." That's too much change for a patch to stable. So we implement this hack one function above and run it on every request. The performance impact of this change should be minimal. Any impact should be offset by benefits from not having hgwebdir processes leak memory.

amend: abort if unresolved merge conflicts found (issue5805) It was checked by repo.commit() before e8a7c1a0565a "cmdutil: remove the redundant commit during amend."

Added signature for changeset 8bba684efde7

Added tag 4.5.2 for changeset 8bba684efde7

merge with security patches

hgweb: always perform permissions checks on protocol commands (BC) (SEC) Previously, the HTTP request handling code would only perform permissions checking on a wire protocol command if that wire protocol command defined its permissions / operation type. This meant that commands (possibly provided by extensions) not defining their operation type would bypass permissions check. This could lead to exfiltration of data from servers and mutating repositories that were supposed to be read-only. This security issue has been present since the permissions table was introduced by d3147b4e3e8a in 2008. This commit changes the behavior of the HTTP server to always perform permissions checking for protocol requests. If an explicit permission for a wire protocol command is not defined, the server assumes the command can be used for writing and governs access accordingly. .. bc:: Wire protocol commands not defining their operation type in ``wireproto.PERMISSIONS`` are now assumed to be used for "push" operations and access control to run those commands is now enforced accordingly.

wireproto: check permissions when executing "batch" command (BC) (SEC) For as long as the "batch" command has existed (introduced by bd88561afb4b and first released as part of Mercurial 1.9), that command (like most wire commands introduced after 2008) lacked an entry in the hgweb permissions table. And since we don't verify permissions if an entry is missing from the permissions table, this meant that executing a command via "batch" would bypass all permissions checks. The security implications are significant: a Mercurial HTTP server would allow writes via "batch" wire protocol commands as long as the HTTP request were processed by Mercurial and the process running the Mercurial HTTP server had write access to the repository. The Mercurial defaults of servers being read-only and the various web.* config options to define access control were bypassed. In addition, "batch" could be used to exfiltrate data from servers that were configured to not allow read access. Both forms of permissions bypass could be mitigated to some extent by using HTTP authentication. This would prevent HTTP requests from hitting Mercurial's server logic. However, any authenticated request would still be able to bypass permissions checks via "batch" commands. The easiest exploit was to send "pushkey" commands via "batch" and modify the state of bookmarks, phases, and obsolescence markers. However, I suspect a well-crafted HTTP request could trick the server into running the "unbundle" wire protocol command, effectively performing a full `hg push` to create new changesets on the remote. This commit plugs this gaping security hole by having the "batch" command perform permissions checking on each sub-command that is being batched. We do this by threading a permissions checking callable all the way to the protocol handler. The threading is a bit hacky from a code perspective. But it preserves API compatibility, which is the proper thing to do on the stable branch. One of the subtle things we do is assume that a command with an undefined permission is a "push" command. This is the safest thing to do from a security perspective: we don't want to take chances that a command could perform a write even though the server is configured to not allow writes. As the test changes demonstrate, it is no longer possible to bypass permissions via the "batch" wire protocol command. .. bc:: The "batch" wire protocol command now enforces permissions of each invoked sub-command. Wire protocol commands must define their operation type or the "batch" command will assume they can write data and will prevent their execution on HTTP servers unless the HTTP request method is POST, the server is configured to allow pushes, and the (possibly authenticated) HTTP user is authorized to perform a push.