convert: test for shell injection in git calls (SEC)
CVE-2016-3069 (5/5)
Before recent refactoring we were not escaping calls to git at all
which made such injections possible. Let's have a test for that to
avoid this problem in the future. Reported by Blake Burkhart.
--- a/tests/test-convert-git.t Tue Mar 22 17:05:11 2016 -0700
+++ b/tests/test-convert-git.t Tue Mar 22 17:27:27 2016 -0700
@@ -729,3 +729,20 @@
$ mv git-repo4/.git/objects/$TREE_OBJ git-repo4/.git/objects/$TREE_OBJ.tmp
$ hg convert git-repo4 git-repo4-broken-hg 2>&1 | grep 'abort:'
abort: cannot read changes in 1c0ce3c5886f83a1d78a7b517cdff5cf9ca17bdd
+
+test for escaping the repo name (CVE-2016-3069)
+
+ $ git init '`echo pwned >COMMAND-INJECTION`'
+ Initialized empty Git repository in $TESTTMP/`echo pwned >COMMAND-INJECTION`/.git/
+ $ cd '`echo pwned >COMMAND-INJECTION`'
+ $ git commit -q --allow-empty -m 'empty'
+ $ cd ..
+ $ hg convert '`echo pwned >COMMAND-INJECTION`' 'converted'
+ initializing destination converted repository
+ scanning source...
+ sorting...
+ converting...
+ 0 empty
+ updating bookmarks
+ $ test -f COMMAND-INJECTION
+ [1]