Mercurial > hg
view tests/test-audit-path.t @ 36367:043e77f3be09
sshpeer: return framed file object when needed
Currently, wireproto.wirepeer has a default implementation of
_submitbatch() and sshv1peer has a very similar implementation.
The main difference is that sshv1peer is aware of the total amount
of bytes it can read whereas the default implementation reads the
stream until no more data is returned. The default implementation
works for HTTP, since there is a known end to HTTP responses (either
Content-Length or 0 sized chunk).
This commit teaches sshv1peer to use our just-introduced "cappedreader"
class for wrapping a file object to limit the number of bytes that
can be read. We do this by introducing an argument to specify whether
the response is framed. If set, we returned a cappedreader instance
instead of the raw pipe.
_call() always has framed responses. So we set this argument
unconditionally and then .read() the entirety of the result.
Strictly speaking, we don't need to use cappedreader in this case
and can inline frame decoding/read logic. But I like when things
are consistent. The overhead should be negligible.
_callstream() and _callcompressable() are special: whether framing
is used depends on the specific command. So, we define a set
of commands that have framed response. It currently only
contains "batch."
As a result of this change, the one-off implementation of
_submitbatch() in sshv1peer can be removed since it is now
safe to .read() the response's file object until end of stream.
cappedreader takes care of not overrunning the frame.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D2380
author | Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 21 Feb 2018 08:35:48 -0800 |
parents | 4441705b7111 |
children | 656ac240f392 |
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$ hg init audit of .hg $ hg add .hg/00changelog.i abort: path contains illegal component: .hg/00changelog.i [255] #if symlink Symlinks $ mkdir a $ echo a > a/a $ hg ci -Ama adding a/a $ ln -s a b $ echo b > a/b $ hg add b/b abort: path 'b/b' traverses symbolic link 'b' [255] $ hg add b should still fail - maybe $ hg add b/b abort: path 'b/b' traverses symbolic link 'b' [255] $ hg commit -m 'add symlink b' Test symlink traversing when accessing history: ----------------------------------------------- (build a changeset where the path exists as a directory) $ hg up 0 0 files updated, 0 files merged, 1 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ mkdir b $ echo c > b/a $ hg add b/a $ hg ci -m 'add directory b' created new head Test that hg cat does not do anything wrong the working copy has 'b' as directory $ hg cat b/a c $ hg cat -r "desc(directory)" b/a c $ hg cat -r "desc(symlink)" b/a b/a: no such file in rev bc151a1f53bd [1] Test that hg cat does not do anything wrong the working copy has 'b' as a symlink (issue4749) $ hg up 'desc(symlink)' 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 1 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ hg cat b/a b/a: no such file in rev bc151a1f53bd [1] $ hg cat -r "desc(directory)" b/a c $ hg cat -r "desc(symlink)" b/a b/a: no such file in rev bc151a1f53bd [1] #endif unbundle tampered bundle $ hg init target $ cd target $ hg unbundle "$TESTDIR/bundles/tampered.hg" adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 5 changesets with 6 changes to 6 files (+4 heads) new changesets b7da9bf6b037:fc1393d727bc (run 'hg heads' to see heads, 'hg merge' to merge) attack .hg/test $ hg manifest -r0 .hg/test $ hg update -Cr0 abort: path contains illegal component: .hg/test [255] attack foo/.hg/test $ hg manifest -r1 foo/.hg/test $ hg update -Cr1 abort: path 'foo/.hg/test' is inside nested repo 'foo' [255] attack back/test where back symlinks to .. $ hg manifest -r2 back back/test #if symlink $ hg update -Cr2 abort: path 'back/test' traverses symbolic link 'back' [255] #else ('back' will be a file and cause some other system specific error) $ hg update -Cr2 back: is both a file and a directory abort: * (glob) [255] #endif attack ../test $ hg manifest -r3 ../test $ mkdir ../test $ echo data > ../test/file $ hg update -Cr3 abort: path contains illegal component: ../test [255] $ cat ../test/file data attack /tmp/test $ hg manifest -r4 /tmp/test $ hg update -Cr4 abort: path contains illegal component: /tmp/test [255] $ cd .. Test symlink traversal on merge: -------------------------------- #if symlink set up symlink hell $ mkdir merge-symlink-out $ hg init merge-symlink $ cd merge-symlink $ touch base $ hg commit -qAm base $ ln -s ../merge-symlink-out a $ hg commit -qAm 'symlink a -> ../merge-symlink-out' $ hg up -q 0 $ mkdir a $ touch a/poisoned $ hg commit -qAm 'file a/poisoned' $ hg log -G -T '{rev}: {desc}\n' @ 2: file a/poisoned | | o 1: symlink a -> ../merge-symlink-out |/ o 0: base try trivial merge $ hg up -qC 1 $ hg merge 2 abort: path 'a/poisoned' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] try rebase onto other revision: cache of audited paths should be discarded, and the rebase should fail (issue5628) $ hg up -qC 2 $ hg rebase -s 2 -d 1 --config extensions.rebase= rebasing 2:e73c21d6b244 "file a/poisoned" (tip) abort: path 'a/poisoned' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] $ ls ../merge-symlink-out $ cd .. Test symlink traversal on update: --------------------------------- $ mkdir update-symlink-out $ hg init update-symlink $ cd update-symlink $ ln -s ../update-symlink-out a $ hg commit -qAm 'symlink a -> ../update-symlink-out' $ hg rm a $ mkdir a && touch a/b $ hg ci -qAm 'file a/b' a/b $ hg up -qC 0 $ hg rm a $ mkdir a && touch a/c $ hg ci -qAm 'rm a, file a/c' $ hg log -G -T '{rev}: {desc}\n' @ 2: rm a, file a/c | | o 1: file a/b |/ o 0: symlink a -> ../update-symlink-out try linear update where symlink already exists: $ hg up -qC 0 $ hg up 1 abort: path 'a/b' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] try linear update including symlinked directory and its content: paths are audited first by calculateupdates(), where no symlink is created so both 'a' and 'a/b' are taken as good paths. still applyupdates() should fail. $ hg up -qC null $ hg up 1 abort: path 'a/b' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] $ ls ../update-symlink-out try branch update replacing directory with symlink, and its content: the path 'a' is audited as a directory first, which should be audited again as a symlink. $ rm -f a $ hg up -qC 2 $ hg up 1 abort: path 'a/b' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] $ ls ../update-symlink-out $ cd .. #endif