Mercurial > hg
view tests/test-censor.t @ 25757:4d1382fd96ff
context: write dirstate out explicitly at the end of markcommitted
To detect change of a file without redundant comparison of file
content, dirstate recognizes a file as certainly clean, if:
(1) it is already known as "normal",
(2) dirstate entry for it has valid (= not "-1") timestamp, and
(3) mode, size and timestamp of it on the filesystem are as same as
ones expected in dirstate
This works as expected in many cases, but doesn't in the corner case
that changing a file keeps mode, size and timestamp of it on the
filesystem.
The timetable below shows steps in one of typical such situations:
---- ----------------------------------- ----------------
timestamp of "f"
----------------
dirstate file-
time action mem file system
---- ----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
* *** ***
- 'hg transplant REV1 REV2 ...'
- transplanting REV1
....
N
- change "f", but keep size N
(via 'patch.patch()')
- 'dirstate.normal("f")' N ***
(via 'repo.commit()')
- transplanting REV2
- change "f", but keep size N
(via 'patch.patch()')
- aborted while patching
N+1
- release wlock
- 'dirstate.write()' N N N
- 'hg status' shows "r1" as "clean" N N N
---- ----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
The most important point is that 'dirstate.write()' is executed at N+1
or later. This causes writing dirstate timestamp N of "f" out
successfully. If it is executed at N, 'parsers.pack_dirstate()'
replaces timestamp N with "-1" before actual writing dirstate out.
This issue can occur when 'hg transplant' satisfies conditions below:
- multiple revisions to be transplanted change the same file
- those revisions don't change mode and size of the file, and
- the 2nd or later revision of them fails after changing the file
The root cause of this issue is that files are changed without
flushing in-memory dirstate changes via 'repo.commit()' (even though
omitting 'dirstate.normallookup()' on files changed by 'patch.patch()'
for efficiency also causes this issue).
To detect changes of files correctly, this patch writes in-memory
dirstate changes out explicitly after marking files as clean in
'committablectx.markcommitted()', which is invoked via
'repo.commit()'.
After this change, timetable is changed as below:
---- ----------------------------------- ----------------
timestamp of "f"
----------------
dirstate file-
time action mem file system
---- ----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
* *** ***
- 'hg transplant REV1 REV2 ...'
- transplanting REV1
....
N
- change "f", but keep size N
(via 'patch.patch()')
- 'dirstate.normal("f")' N ***
(via 'repo.commit()')
----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
- 'dirsttate.write()' -1 -1
----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
- transplanting REV2
- change "f", but keep size N
(via 'patch.patch()')
- aborted while patching
N+1
- release wlock
- 'dirstate.write()' -1 -1 N
- 'hg status' shows "r1" as "clean" -1 -1 N
---- ----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
To reproduce this issue in tests certainly, this patch emulates some
timing critical actions as below:
- change "f" at N
'patch.patch()' with 'fakepatchtime.py' explicitly changes mtime
of patched files to "2000-01-01 00:00" (= N).
- 'dirstate.write()' via 'repo.commit()' at N
'fakedirstatewritetime.py' forces 'pack_dirstate()' to use
"2000-01-01 00:00" as "now", only if 'pack_dirstate()' is invoked
via 'committablectx.markcommitted()'.
- 'dirstate.write()' via releasing wlock at N+1 (or "not at N")
'pack_dirstate()' via releasing wlock uses actual timestamp at
runtime as "now", and it should be different from the "2000-01-01
00:00" of "f".
BTW, this patch doesn't test cases below, even though 'patch.patch()'
is used similarly in these cases:
1. failure of 'hg import' or 'hg qpush'
2. success of 'hg import', 'hg qpush' or 'hg transplant'
Case (1) above doesn't cause this kind of issue, because:
- if patching is aborted by conflicts, changed files are committed
changed files are marked as CLEAN, even though they are partially
patched.
- otherwise, dirstate are fully restored by 'dirstateguard'
For example in timetable above, timestamp of "f" in .hg/dirstate
is restored to -1 (or less than N), and subsequent 'hg status' can
detect changes correctly.
Case (2) always causes 'repo.status()' invocation via 'repo.commit()'
just after changing files inside same wlock scope.
---- ----------------------------------- ----------------
timestamp of "f"
----------------
dirstate file-
time action mem file system
---- ----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
N *** ***
- make file "f" clean N
- execute 'hg foobar'
....
- 'dirstate.normal("f")' N ***
(e.g. via dirty check
or previous 'repo.commit()')
- change "f", but keep size N
- 'repo.status()' (*1)
(via 'repo.commit()')
---- ----------------------------------- ---- ----- -----
At a glance, 'repo.status()' at (*1) seems to cause similar issue (=
"changed files are treated as clean"), but actually doesn't.
'dirstate._lastnormaltime' should be N at (*1) above, because
'dirstate.normal()' via dirty check is finished at N.
Therefore, "f" changed at N (= 'dirstate._lastnormaltime') is forcibly
treated as "unsure" at (*1), and changes are detected as expected (see
'dirstate.status()' for detail).
If 'hg import' is executed with '--no-commit', 'repo.status()' isn't
invoked just after changing files inside same wlock scope.
But preceding 'dirstate.normal()' is invoked inside another wlock
scope via 'cmdutil.bailifchanged()', and in-memory changes should be
flushed at the end of that scope.
Therefore, timestamp N of clean "f" should be replaced by -1, if
'dirstate.write()' is invoked at N. It means that condition of this
issue isn't satisfied.
author | FUJIWARA Katsunori <foozy@lares.dti.ne.jp> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 08 Jul 2015 17:01:09 +0900 |
parents | 8de8cd34f2e3 |
children | 5e18f6e39006 |
line wrap: on
line source
$ cat >> $HGRCPATH <<EOF > [extensions] > censor= > EOF $ cp $HGRCPATH $HGRCPATH.orig Create repo with unimpeachable content $ hg init r $ cd r $ echo 'Initially untainted file' > target $ echo 'Normal file here' > bystander $ hg add target bystander $ hg ci -m init Clone repo so we can test pull later $ cd .. $ hg clone r rpull updating to branch default 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cd r Introduce content which will ultimately require censorship. Name the first censored node C1, second C2, and so on $ echo 'Tainted file' > target $ echo 'Passwords: hunter2' >> target $ hg ci -m taint target $ C1=`hg id --debug -i` $ echo 'hunter3' >> target $ echo 'Normal file v2' > bystander $ hg ci -m moretaint target bystander $ C2=`hg id --debug -i` Add a new sanitized versions to correct our mistake. Name the first head H1, the second head H2, and so on $ echo 'Tainted file is now sanitized' > target $ hg ci -m sanitized target $ H1=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg update -r $C2 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ echo 'Tainted file now super sanitized' > target $ hg ci -m 'super sanitized' target created new head $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` Verify target contents before censorship at each revision $ hg cat -r $H1 target Tainted file is now sanitized $ hg cat -r $H2 target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg cat -r $C2 target Tainted file Passwords: hunter2 hunter3 $ hg cat -r $C1 target Tainted file Passwords: hunter2 $ hg cat -r 0 target Initially untainted file Try to censor revision with too large of a tombstone message $ hg censor -r $C1 -t 'blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah bla' target abort: censor tombstone must be no longer than censored data [255] Censor revision with 2 offenses $ hg censor -r $C2 -t "remove password" target $ hg cat -r $H1 target Tainted file is now sanitized $ hg cat -r $H2 target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg cat -r $C2 target abort: censored node: 1e0247a9a4b7 (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg cat -r $C1 target Tainted file Passwords: hunter2 $ hg cat -r 0 target Initially untainted file Censor revision with 1 offense $ hg censor -r $C1 target $ hg cat -r $H1 target Tainted file is now sanitized $ hg cat -r $H2 target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg cat -r $C2 target abort: censored node: 1e0247a9a4b7 (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg cat -r $C1 target abort: censored node: 613bc869fceb (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg cat -r 0 target Initially untainted file Can only checkout target at uncensored revisions, -X is workaround for --all $ hg revert -r $C2 target abort: censored node: 1e0247a9a4b7 (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg revert -r $C1 target abort: censored node: 613bc869fceb (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg revert -r $C1 --all reverting bystander reverting target abort: censored node: 613bc869fceb (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg revert -r $C1 --all -X target $ cat target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg revert -r 0 --all reverting target $ cat target Initially untainted file $ hg revert -r $H2 --all reverting bystander reverting target $ cat target Tainted file now super sanitized Uncensored file can be viewed at any revision $ hg cat -r $H1 bystander Normal file v2 $ hg cat -r $C2 bystander Normal file v2 $ hg cat -r $C1 bystander Normal file here $ hg cat -r 0 bystander Normal file here Can update to children of censored revision $ hg update -r $H1 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Tainted file is now sanitized $ hg update -r $H2 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Tainted file now super sanitized Set censor policy to abort in trusted $HGRC so hg verify fails $ cp $HGRCPATH.orig $HGRCPATH $ cat >> $HGRCPATH <<EOF > [censor] > policy = abort > EOF Repo fails verification due to censorship $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files target@1: censored file data target@2: censored file data 2 files, 5 changesets, 7 total revisions 2 integrity errors encountered! (first damaged changeset appears to be 1) [1] Cannot update to revision with censored data $ hg update -r $C2 abort: censored node: 1e0247a9a4b7 (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg update -r $C1 abort: censored node: 613bc869fceb (set censor.policy to ignore errors) [255] $ hg update -r 0 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ hg update -r $H2 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved Set censor policy to ignore in trusted $HGRC so hg verify passes $ cp $HGRCPATH.orig $HGRCPATH $ cat >> $HGRCPATH <<EOF > [censor] > policy = ignore > EOF Repo passes verification with warnings with explicit config $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files 2 files, 5 changesets, 7 total revisions May update to revision with censored data with explicit config $ hg update -r $C2 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target $ hg update -r $C1 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target $ hg update -r 0 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Initially untainted file $ hg update -r $H2 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Tainted file now super sanitized Can merge in revision with censored data. Test requires one branch of history with the file censored, but we can't censor at a head, so advance H1. $ hg update -r $H1 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ C3=$H1 $ echo 'advanced head H1' > target $ hg ci -m 'advance head H1' target $ H1=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg censor -r $C3 target $ hg update -r $H2 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ hg merge -r $C3 merging target 0 files updated, 1 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved (branch merge, don't forget to commit) Revisions present in repository heads may not be censored $ hg update -C -r $H2 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ hg censor -r $H2 target abort: cannot censor file in heads (78a8fc215e79) (clean/delete and commit first) [255] $ echo 'twiddling thumbs' > bystander $ hg ci -m 'bystander commit' $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg censor -r "$H2^" target abort: cannot censor file in heads (efbe78065929) (clean/delete and commit first) [255] Cannot censor working directory $ echo 'seriously no passwords' > target $ hg ci -m 'extend second head arbitrarily' target $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg update -r "$H2^" 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ hg censor -r . target abort: cannot censor working directory (clean/delete/update first) [255] $ hg update -r $H2 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved Can re-add file after being deleted + censored $ C4=$H2 $ hg rm target $ hg ci -m 'delete target so it may be censored' $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg censor -r $C4 target $ hg cat -r $C4 target $ hg cat -r "$H2^^" target Tainted file now super sanitized $ echo 'fresh start' > target $ hg add target $ hg ci -m reincarnated target $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg cat -r $H2 target fresh start $ hg cat -r "$H2^" target target: no such file in rev 452ec1762369 [1] $ hg cat -r $C4 target $ hg cat -r "$H2^^^" target Tainted file now super sanitized Can censor after revlog has expanded to no longer permit inline storage $ for x in `python $TESTDIR/seq.py 0 50000` > do > echo "Password: hunter$x" >> target > done $ hg ci -m 'add 100k passwords' $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ C5=$H2 $ hg revert -r "$H2^" target $ hg ci -m 'cleaned 100k passwords' $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ hg censor -r $C5 target $ hg cat -r $C5 target $ hg cat -r $H2 target fresh start Repo with censored nodes can be cloned and cloned nodes are censored $ cd .. $ hg clone r rclone updating to branch default 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cd rclone $ hg cat -r $H1 target advanced head H1 $ hg cat -r $H2~5 target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg cat -r $C2 target $ hg cat -r $C1 target $ hg cat -r 0 target Initially untainted file $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files 2 files, 12 changesets, 13 total revisions Repo cloned before tainted content introduced can pull censored nodes $ cd ../rpull $ hg cat -r tip target Initially untainted file $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files 2 files, 1 changesets, 2 total revisions $ hg pull -r $H1 -r $H2 pulling from $TESTTMP/r (glob) searching for changes adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 11 changesets with 11 changes to 2 files (+1 heads) (run 'hg heads' to see heads, 'hg merge' to merge) $ hg update 4 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg cat -r $H1 target advanced head H1 $ hg cat -r $H2~5 target Tainted file now super sanitized $ hg cat -r $C2 target $ hg cat -r $C1 target $ hg cat -r 0 target Initially untainted file $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files 2 files, 12 changesets, 13 total revisions Censored nodes can be pushed if they censor previously unexchanged nodes $ echo 'Passwords: hunter2hunter2' > target $ hg ci -m 're-add password from clone' target created new head $ H3=`hg id --debug -i` $ REV=$H3 $ echo 'Re-sanitized; nothing to see here' > target $ hg ci -m 're-sanitized' target $ H2=`hg id --debug -i` $ CLEANREV=$H2 $ hg cat -r $REV target Passwords: hunter2hunter2 $ hg censor -r $REV target $ hg cat -r $REV target $ hg cat -r $CLEANREV target Re-sanitized; nothing to see here $ hg push -f -r $H2 pushing to $TESTTMP/r (glob) searching for changes adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 2 changesets with 2 changes to 1 files (+1 heads) $ cd ../r $ hg cat -r $REV target $ hg cat -r $CLEANREV target Re-sanitized; nothing to see here $ hg update $CLEANREV 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Re-sanitized; nothing to see here Censored nodes can be bundled up and unbundled in another repo $ hg bundle --base 0 ../pwbundle 13 changesets found $ cd ../rclone $ hg unbundle ../pwbundle adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 2 changesets with 2 changes to 2 files (+1 heads) (run 'hg heads .' to see heads, 'hg merge' to merge) $ hg cat -r $REV target $ hg cat -r $CLEANREV target Re-sanitized; nothing to see here $ hg update $CLEANREV 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Re-sanitized; nothing to see here $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files 2 files, 14 changesets, 15 total revisions Censored nodes can be imported on top of censored nodes, consecutively $ hg init ../rimport $ hg bundle --base 1 ../rimport/splitbundle 12 changesets found $ cd ../rimport $ hg pull -r $H1 -r $H2 ../r pulling from ../r adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 8 changesets with 10 changes to 2 files (+1 heads) (run 'hg heads' to see heads, 'hg merge' to merge) $ hg unbundle splitbundle adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 6 changesets with 5 changes to 2 files (+1 heads) (run 'hg heads .' to see heads, 'hg merge' to merge) $ hg update $H2 2 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ cat target Re-sanitized; nothing to see here $ hg verify checking changesets checking manifests crosschecking files in changesets and manifests checking files 2 files, 14 changesets, 15 total revisions $ cd ../r Can import bundle where first revision of a file is censored $ hg init ../rinit $ hg censor -r 0 target $ hg bundle -r 0 --base null ../rinit/initbundle 1 changesets found $ cd ../rinit $ hg unbundle initbundle adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 1 changesets with 2 changes to 2 files (run 'hg update' to get a working copy) $ hg cat -r 0 target