Mercurial > hg
view mercurial/sslutil.py @ 29449:5b71a8d7f7ff
sslutil: emit warning when no CA certificates loaded
If no CA certificates are loaded, that is almost certainly a/the
reason certificate verification fails when connecting to a server.
The modern ssl module in Python 2.7.9+ provides an API to access
the list of loaded CA certificates. This patch emits a warning
on modern Python when certificate verification fails and there are
no loaded CA certificates.
There is no way to detect the number of loaded CA certificates
unless the modern ssl module is present. Hence the differences
in test output depending on whether modern ssl is available.
It's worth noting that a test which specifies a CA file still
renders this warning. That is because the certificate it is loading
is a x509 client certificate and not a CA certificate. This
test could be updated if anyone is so inclined.
author | Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 29 Jun 2016 19:43:27 -0700 |
parents | 13edc11eb7b7 |
children | fd93b15b5c30 |
line wrap: on
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# sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial # # Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> # Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <alexis@cecm.usp.br> # Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <vadim.gelfer@gmail.com> # # This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the # GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version. from __future__ import absolute_import import hashlib import os import ssl import sys from .i18n import _ from . import ( error, util, ) # Python 2.7.9+ overhauled the built-in SSL/TLS features of Python. It added # support for TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, SNI, system CA stores, etc. These features are # all exposed via the "ssl" module. # # Depending on the version of Python being used, SSL/TLS support is either # modern/secure or legacy/insecure. Many operations in this module have # separate code paths depending on support in Python. hassni = getattr(ssl, 'HAS_SNI', False) try: OP_NO_SSLv2 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2 OP_NO_SSLv3 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3 except AttributeError: OP_NO_SSLv2 = 0x1000000 OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x2000000 try: # ssl.SSLContext was added in 2.7.9 and presence indicates modern # SSL/TLS features are available. SSLContext = ssl.SSLContext modernssl = True _canloaddefaultcerts = util.safehasattr(SSLContext, 'load_default_certs') except AttributeError: modernssl = False _canloaddefaultcerts = False # We implement SSLContext using the interface from the standard library. class SSLContext(object): # ssl.wrap_socket gained the "ciphers" named argument in 2.7. _supportsciphers = sys.version_info >= (2, 7) def __init__(self, protocol): # From the public interface of SSLContext self.protocol = protocol self.check_hostname = False self.options = 0 self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE # Used by our implementation. self._certfile = None self._keyfile = None self._certpassword = None self._cacerts = None self._ciphers = None def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None): self._certfile = certfile self._keyfile = keyfile self._certpassword = password def load_default_certs(self, purpose=None): pass def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None): if capath: raise error.Abort(_('capath not supported')) if cadata: raise error.Abort(_('cadata not supported')) self._cacerts = cafile def set_ciphers(self, ciphers): if not self._supportsciphers: raise error.Abort(_('setting ciphers not supported')) self._ciphers = ciphers def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False): # server_hostname is unique to SSLContext.wrap_socket and is used # for SNI in that context. So there's nothing for us to do with it # in this legacy code since we don't support SNI. args = { 'keyfile': self._keyfile, 'certfile': self._certfile, 'server_side': server_side, 'cert_reqs': self.verify_mode, 'ssl_version': self.protocol, 'ca_certs': self._cacerts, } if self._supportsciphers: args['ciphers'] = self._ciphers return ssl.wrap_socket(socket, **args) def _hostsettings(ui, hostname): """Obtain security settings for a hostname. Returns a dict of settings relevant to that hostname. """ s = { # Whether we should attempt to load default/available CA certs # if an explicit ``cafile`` is not defined. 'allowloaddefaultcerts': True, # List of 2-tuple of (hash algorithm, hash). 'certfingerprints': [], # Path to file containing concatenated CA certs. Used by # SSLContext.load_verify_locations(). 'cafile': None, # Whether certificate verification should be disabled. 'disablecertverification': False, # Whether the legacy [hostfingerprints] section has data for this host. 'legacyfingerprint': False, # ssl.CERT_* constant used by SSLContext.verify_mode. 'verifymode': None, } # Look for fingerprints in [hostsecurity] section. Value is a list # of <alg>:<fingerprint> strings. fingerprints = ui.configlist('hostsecurity', '%s:fingerprints' % hostname, []) for fingerprint in fingerprints: if not (fingerprint.startswith(('sha1:', 'sha256:', 'sha512:'))): raise error.Abort(_('invalid fingerprint for %s: %s') % ( hostname, fingerprint), hint=_('must begin with "sha1:", "sha256:", ' 'or "sha512:"')) alg, fingerprint = fingerprint.split(':', 1) fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(':', '').lower() s['certfingerprints'].append((alg, fingerprint)) # Fingerprints from [hostfingerprints] are always SHA-1. for fingerprint in ui.configlist('hostfingerprints', hostname, []): fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(':', '').lower() s['certfingerprints'].append(('sha1', fingerprint)) s['legacyfingerprint'] = True # If a host cert fingerprint is defined, it is the only thing that # matters. No need to validate CA certs. if s['certfingerprints']: s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False # If --insecure is used, don't take CAs into consideration. elif ui.insecureconnections: s['disablecertverification'] = True s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False if ui.configbool('devel', 'disableloaddefaultcerts'): s['allowloaddefaultcerts'] = False # If both fingerprints and a per-host ca file are specified, issue a warning # because users should not be surprised about what security is or isn't # being performed. cafile = ui.config('hostsecurity', '%s:verifycertsfile' % hostname) if s['certfingerprints'] and cafile: ui.warn(_('(hostsecurity.%s:verifycertsfile ignored when host ' 'fingerprints defined; using host fingerprints for ' 'verification)\n') % hostname) # Try to hook up CA certificate validation unless something above # makes it not necessary. if s['verifymode'] is None: # Look at per-host ca file first. if cafile: cafile = util.expandpath(cafile) if not os.path.exists(cafile): raise error.Abort(_('path specified by %s does not exist: %s') % ('hostsecurity.%s:verifycertsfile' % hostname, cafile)) s['cafile'] = cafile else: # Find global certificates file in config. cafile = ui.config('web', 'cacerts') if cafile: cafile = util.expandpath(cafile) if not os.path.exists(cafile): raise error.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') % cafile) else: # No global CA certs. See if we can load defaults. cafile = _defaultcacerts() if cafile: ui.debug('using %s to enable OS X system CA\n' % cafile) s['cafile'] = cafile # Require certificate validation if CA certs are being loaded and # verification hasn't been disabled above. if cafile or (_canloaddefaultcerts and s['allowloaddefaultcerts']): s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED else: # At this point we don't have a fingerprint, aren't being # explicitly insecure, and can't load CA certs. Connecting # is insecure. We allow the connection and abort during # validation (once we have the fingerprint to print to the # user). s['verifymode'] = ssl.CERT_NONE assert s['verifymode'] is not None return s def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, serverhostname=None): """Add SSL/TLS to a socket. This is a glorified wrapper for ``ssl.wrap_socket()``. It makes sane choices based on what security options are available. In addition to the arguments supported by ``ssl.wrap_socket``, we allow the following additional arguments: * serverhostname - The expected hostname of the remote server. If the server (and client) support SNI, this tells the server which certificate to use. """ if not serverhostname: raise error.Abort(_('serverhostname argument is required')) settings = _hostsettings(ui, serverhostname) # Despite its name, PROTOCOL_SSLv23 selects the highest protocol # that both ends support, including TLS protocols. On legacy stacks, # the highest it likely goes in TLS 1.0. On modern stacks, it can # support TLS 1.2. # # The PROTOCOL_TLSv* constants select a specific TLS version # only (as opposed to multiple versions). So the method for # supporting multiple TLS versions is to use PROTOCOL_SSLv23 and # disable protocols via SSLContext.options and OP_NO_* constants. # However, SSLContext.options doesn't work unless we have the # full/real SSLContext available to us. # # SSLv2 and SSLv3 are broken. We ban them outright. if modernssl: protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23 else: protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1 # TODO use ssl.create_default_context() on modernssl. sslcontext = SSLContext(protocol) # This is a no-op on old Python. sslcontext.options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 | OP_NO_SSLv3 # This still works on our fake SSLContext. sslcontext.verify_mode = settings['verifymode'] if certfile is not None: def password(): f = keyfile or certfile return ui.getpass(_('passphrase for %s: ') % f, '') sslcontext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, password) if settings['cafile'] is not None: try: sslcontext.load_verify_locations(cafile=settings['cafile']) except ssl.SSLError as e: raise error.Abort(_('error loading CA file %s: %s') % ( settings['cafile'], e.args[1]), hint=_('file is empty or malformed?')) caloaded = True elif settings['allowloaddefaultcerts']: # This is a no-op on old Python. sslcontext.load_default_certs() caloaded = True else: caloaded = False try: sslsocket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=serverhostname) except ssl.SSLError: # If we're doing certificate verification and no CA certs are loaded, # that is almost certainly the reason why verification failed. Provide # a hint to the user. # Only modern ssl module exposes SSLContext.get_ca_certs() so we can # only show this warning if modern ssl is available. if (caloaded and settings['verifymode'] == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED and modernssl and not sslcontext.get_ca_certs()): ui.warn(_('(an attempt was made to load CA certificates but none ' 'were loaded; see ' 'https://mercurial-scm.org/wiki/SecureConnections for ' 'how to configure Mercurial to avoid this error)\n')) raise # check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been # closed # - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721 if not sslsocket.cipher(): raise error.Abort(_('ssl connection failed')) sslsocket._hgstate = { 'caloaded': caloaded, 'hostname': serverhostname, 'settings': settings, 'ui': ui, } return sslsocket def _verifycert(cert, hostname): '''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname. CRLs is not handled. Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success. ''' if not cert: return _('no certificate received') dnsname = hostname.lower() def matchdnsname(certname): return (certname == dnsname or '.' in dnsname and certname == '*.' + dnsname.split('.', 1)[1]) san = cert.get('subjectAltName', []) if san: certnames = [value.lower() for key, value in san if key == 'DNS'] for name in certnames: if matchdnsname(name): return None if certnames: return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(certnames) # subject is only checked when subjectAltName is empty for s in cert.get('subject', []): key, value = s[0] if key == 'commonName': try: # 'subject' entries are unicode certname = value.lower().encode('ascii') except UnicodeEncodeError: return _('IDN in certificate not supported') if matchdnsname(certname): return None return _('certificate is for %s') % certname return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate') def _plainapplepython(): """return true if this seems to be a pure Apple Python that * is unfrozen and presumably has the whole mercurial module in the file system * presumably is an Apple Python that uses Apple OpenSSL which has patches for using system certificate store CAs in addition to the provided cacerts file """ if sys.platform != 'darwin' or util.mainfrozen() or not sys.executable: return False exe = os.path.realpath(sys.executable).lower() return (exe.startswith('/usr/bin/python') or exe.startswith('/system/library/frameworks/python.framework/')) def _defaultcacerts(): """return path to default CA certificates or None.""" if _plainapplepython(): dummycert = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'dummycert.pem') if os.path.exists(dummycert): return dummycert return None def validatesocket(sock): """Validate a socket meets security requiremnets. The passed socket must have been created with ``wrapsocket()``. """ host = sock._hgstate['hostname'] ui = sock._hgstate['ui'] settings = sock._hgstate['settings'] try: peercert = sock.getpeercert(True) peercert2 = sock.getpeercert() except AttributeError: raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host) if not peercert: raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: ' 'no certificate received') % host) if settings['disablecertverification']: # We don't print the certificate fingerprint because it shouldn't # be necessary: if the user requested certificate verification be # disabled, they presumably already saw a message about the inability # to verify the certificate and this message would have printed the # fingerprint. So printing the fingerprint here adds little to no # value. ui.warn(_('warning: connection security to %s is disabled per current ' 'settings; communication is susceptible to eavesdropping ' 'and tampering\n') % host) return # If a certificate fingerprint is pinned, use it and only it to # validate the remote cert. peerfingerprints = { 'sha1': hashlib.sha1(peercert).hexdigest(), 'sha256': hashlib.sha256(peercert).hexdigest(), 'sha512': hashlib.sha512(peercert).hexdigest(), } def fmtfingerprint(s): return ':'.join([s[x:x + 2] for x in range(0, len(s), 2)]) nicefingerprint = 'sha256:%s' % fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints['sha256']) if settings['certfingerprints']: for hash, fingerprint in settings['certfingerprints']: if peerfingerprints[hash].lower() == fingerprint: ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s:%s\n' % (host, hash, fmtfingerprint(fingerprint))) return # Pinned fingerprint didn't match. This is a fatal error. if settings['legacyfingerprint']: section = 'hostfingerprint' nice = fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints['sha1']) else: section = 'hostsecurity' nice = '%s:%s' % (hash, fmtfingerprint(peerfingerprints[hash])) raise error.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected ' 'fingerprint %s') % (host, nice), hint=_('check %s configuration') % section) # Security is enabled but no CAs are loaded. We can't establish trust # for the cert so abort. if not sock._hgstate['caloaded']: raise error.Abort( _('unable to verify security of %s (no loaded CA certificates); ' 'refusing to connect') % host, hint=_('see https://mercurial-scm.org/wiki/SecureConnections for ' 'how to configure Mercurial to avoid this error or set ' 'hostsecurity.%s:fingerprints=%s to trust this server') % (host, nicefingerprint)) msg = _verifycert(peercert2, host) if msg: raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg), hint=_('set hostsecurity.%s:certfingerprints=%s ' 'config setting or use --insecure to connect ' 'insecurely') % (host, nicefingerprint))