Mercurial > hg
view mercurial/sslutil.py @ 17658:a02c1ffddae9 stable
largefiles: handle commit -A properly, after a --large commit (issue3542)
Previous to this, 'commit -A' would add as normal files, files that were already
committed as largefiles, resulting in files being listed twice by 'status -A'.
It also missed when (only) a largefile was deleted, even though status reported
it as '!'. This also has the side effect of properly reporting the state of the
affected largefiles in the post commit hook after a remove that also affected a
normal file (the largefiles used to be 'R', now are properly absent).
Since scmutil.addremove() is called both by the ui command (after some trivial
argument validation) and during the commit process when -A is specified, it
seems like a more appropriate method to wrap than the addremove command.
Currently, a repo is only enabled to use largefiles after an add that explicitly
identifies some file as large, and a subsequent commit. Therefore, this patch
only changes behavior after such a largefile enabling commit.
Note that in the test, if the final commit had a '-v', 'removing large8' would
be printed twice. Both of these originate in removelargefiles(). The first
print is in verbose mode after traversing remove + forget, the second is because
the '_isaddremove' attr is set and 'after' is not.
author | Matt Harbison <matt_harbison@yahoo.com> |
---|---|
date | Mon, 30 Jul 2012 20:56:41 -0400 |
parents | 9cf7c9d529d0 |
children | 93b03a222c3e |
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# sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial # # Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> # Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <alexis@cecm.usp.br> # Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <vadim.gelfer@gmail.com> # # This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the # GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version. import os from mercurial import util from mercurial.i18n import _ try: # avoid using deprecated/broken FakeSocket in python 2.6 import ssl CERT_REQUIRED = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED def ssl_wrap_socket(sock, keyfile, certfile, cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE, ca_certs=None): sslsocket = ssl.wrap_socket(sock, keyfile, certfile, cert_reqs=cert_reqs, ca_certs=ca_certs) # check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been closed # - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721 if not sslsocket.cipher(): raise util.Abort(_('ssl connection failed')) return sslsocket except ImportError: CERT_REQUIRED = 2 import socket, httplib def ssl_wrap_socket(sock, key_file, cert_file, cert_reqs=CERT_REQUIRED, ca_certs=None): if not util.safehasattr(socket, 'ssl'): raise util.Abort(_('Python SSL support not found')) if ca_certs: raise util.Abort(_( 'certificate checking requires Python 2.6')) ssl = socket.ssl(sock, key_file, cert_file) return httplib.FakeSocket(sock, ssl) def _verifycert(cert, hostname): '''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname. CRLs is not handled. Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success. ''' if not cert: return _('no certificate received') dnsname = hostname.lower() def matchdnsname(certname): return (certname == dnsname or '.' in dnsname and certname == '*.' + dnsname.split('.', 1)[1]) san = cert.get('subjectAltName', []) if san: certnames = [value.lower() for key, value in san if key == 'DNS'] for name in certnames: if matchdnsname(name): return None if certnames: return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(certnames) # subject is only checked when subjectAltName is empty for s in cert.get('subject', []): key, value = s[0] if key == 'commonName': try: # 'subject' entries are unicode certname = value.lower().encode('ascii') except UnicodeEncodeError: return _('IDN in certificate not supported') if matchdnsname(certname): return None return _('certificate is for %s') % certname return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate') # CERT_REQUIRED means fetch the cert from the server all the time AND # validate it against the CA store provided in web.cacerts. # # We COMPLETELY ignore CERT_REQUIRED on Python <= 2.5, as it's totally # busted on those versions. def sslkwargs(ui, host): cacerts = ui.config('web', 'cacerts') hostfingerprint = ui.config('hostfingerprints', host) if cacerts and not hostfingerprint: cacerts = util.expandpath(cacerts) if not os.path.exists(cacerts): raise util.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') % cacerts) return {'ca_certs': cacerts, 'cert_reqs': CERT_REQUIRED, } return {} class validator(object): def __init__(self, ui, host): self.ui = ui self.host = host def __call__(self, sock): host = self.host cacerts = self.ui.config('web', 'cacerts') hostfingerprint = self.ui.config('hostfingerprints', host) if not getattr(sock, 'getpeercert', False): # python 2.5 ? if hostfingerprint: raise util.Abort(_("host fingerprint for %s can't be " "verified (Python too old)") % host) if self.ui.configbool('ui', 'reportoldssl', True): self.ui.warn(_("warning: certificate for %s can't be verified " "(Python too old)\n") % host) return if not sock.cipher(): # work around http://bugs.python.org/issue13721 raise util.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host) peercert = sock.getpeercert(True) if not peercert: raise util.Abort(_('%s certificate error: ' 'no certificate received') % host) peerfingerprint = util.sha1(peercert).hexdigest() nicefingerprint = ":".join([peerfingerprint[x:x + 2] for x in xrange(0, len(peerfingerprint), 2)]) if hostfingerprint: if peerfingerprint.lower() != \ hostfingerprint.replace(':', '').lower(): raise util.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected ' 'fingerprint %s') % (host, nicefingerprint), hint=_('check hostfingerprint configuration')) self.ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s\n' % (host, nicefingerprint)) elif cacerts: msg = _verifycert(sock.getpeercert(), host) if msg: raise util.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg), hint=_('configure hostfingerprint %s or use ' '--insecure to connect insecurely') % nicefingerprint) self.ui.debug('%s certificate successfully verified\n' % host) else: self.ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s not ' 'verified (check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts ' 'config setting)\n') % (host, nicefingerprint))