view tests/test-unbundlehash.t @ 30766:d7bf7d2bd5ab

hgweb: support Content Security Policy

Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a web security feature that allows
servers to declare what loaded content is allowed to do. For example,
a policy can prevent loading of images, JavaScript, CSS, etc unless
the source of that content is whitelisted (by hostname, URI scheme,
hashes of content, etc). It's a nifty security feature that provides
extra mitigation against some attacks, notably XSS.

Mitigation against these attacks is important for Mercurial because
hgweb renders repository data, which is commonly untrusted. While we
make attempts to escape things, etc, there's the possibility that
malicious data could be injected into the site content. If this happens
today, the full power of the web browser is available to that
malicious content. A restrictive CSP policy (defined by the server
operator and sent in an HTTP header which is outside the control of
malicious content), could restrict browser capabilities and mitigate
security problems posed by malicious data.

CSP works by emitting an HTTP header declaring the policy that browsers
should apply. Ideally, this header would be emitted by a layer above
Mercurial (likely the HTTP server doing the WSGI "proxying"). This
works for some CSP policies, but not all.

For example, policies to allow inline JavaScript may require setting
a "nonce" attribute on <script>. This attribute value must be unique
and non-guessable. And, the value must be present in the HTTP header
and the HTML body. This means that coordinating the value between
Mercurial and another HTTP server could be difficult: it is much
easier to generate and emit the nonce in a central location.

This commit introduces support for emitting a
Content-Security-Policy header from hgweb. A config option defines
the header value. If present, the header is emitted. A special
"%nonce%" syntax in the value triggers generation of a nonce and
inclusion in <script> elements in templates. The inclusion of a
nonce does not occur unless "%nonce%" is present. This makes this
commit completely backwards compatible and the feature opt-in.

The nonce is a type 4 UUID, which is the flavor that is randomly
generated. It has 122 random bits, which should be plenty to satisfy
the guarantees of a nonce.

#require killdaemons

Test wire protocol unbundle with hashed heads (capability: unbundlehash)

  $ cat << EOF >> $HGRCPATH
  > [devel]
  > # This tests is intended for bundle1 only.
  > # bundle2 carries the head information inside the bundle itself and
  > # always uses 'force' as the heads value.
  > legacy.exchange = bundle1
  > EOF

Create a remote repository.

  $ hg init remote
  $ hg serve -R remote --config web.push_ssl=False --config web.allow_push=* -p $HGPORT -d --pid-file=hg1.pid -E error.log -A access.log
  $ cat hg1.pid >> $DAEMON_PIDS

Clone the repository and push a change.

  $ hg clone http://localhost:$HGPORT/ local
  no changes found
  updating to branch default
  0 files updated, 0 files merged, 0 files removed, 0 files unresolved
  $ touch local/README
  $ hg ci -R local -A -m hoge
  adding README
  $ hg push -R local
  pushing to http://localhost:$HGPORT/
  searching for changes
  remote: adding changesets
  remote: adding manifests
  remote: adding file changes
  remote: added 1 changesets with 1 changes to 1 files

Ensure hashed heads format is used.
The hash here is always the same since the remote repository only has the null head.

  $ cat access.log | grep unbundle
  * - - [*] "POST /?cmd=unbundle HTTP/1.1" 200 - x-hgarg-1:heads=686173686564+6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f* (glob)

Explicitly kill daemons to let the test exit on Windows

  $ killdaemons.py