Mercurial > hg
view tests/httpserverauth.py @ 46607:e9901d01d135
revlog: add a mechanism to verify expected file position before appending
If someone uses `hg debuglocks`, or some non-hg process writes to the .hg
directory without respecting the locks, or if the repo's on a networked
filesystem, it's possible for the revlog code to write out corrupted data.
The form of this corruption can vary depending on what data was written and how
that happened. We are in the "networked filesystem" case (though I've had users
also do this to themselves with the "`hg debuglocks`" scenario), and most often
see this with the changelog. What ends up happening is we produce two items
(let's call them rev1 and rev2) in the .i file that have the same linkrev,
baserev, and offset into the .d file, while the data in the .d file is appended
properly. rev2's compressed_size is accurate for rev2, but when we go to
decompress the data in the .d file, we use the offset that's recorded in the
index file, which is the same as rev1, and attempt to decompress
rev2.compressed_size bytes of rev1's data. This usually does not succeed. :)
When using inline data, this also fails, though I haven't investigated why too
closely. This shows up as a "patch decode" error. I believe what's happening
there is that we're basically ignoring the offset field, getting the data
properly, but since baserev != rev, it thinks this is a delta based on rev
(instead of a full text) and can't actually apply it as such.
For now, I'm going to make this an optional component and default it to entirely
off. I may increase the default severity of this in the future, once I've
enabled it for my users and we gain more experience with it. Luckily, most of my
users have a versioned filesystem and can roll back to before the corruption has
been written, it's just a hassle to do so and not everyone knows how (so it's a
support burden). Users on other filesystems will not have that luxury, and this
can cause them to have a corrupted repository that they are unlikely to know how
to resolve, and they'll see this as a data-loss event. Refusing to create the
corruption is a much better user experience.
This mechanism is not perfect. There may be false-negatives (racy writes that
are not detected). There should not be any false-positives (non-racy writes that
are detected as such). This is not a mechanism that makes putting a repo on a
networked filesystem "safe" or "supported", just *less* likely to cause
corruption.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D9952
author | Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 03 Feb 2021 16:33:10 -0800 |
parents | 2372284d9457 |
children | 6000f5b25c9b |
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from __future__ import absolute_import import base64 import hashlib from mercurial.hgweb import common from mercurial import node def parse_keqv_list(req, l): """Parse list of key=value strings where keys are not duplicated.""" parsed = {} for elt in l: k, v = elt.split(b'=', 1) if v[0:1] == b'"' and v[-1:] == b'"': v = v[1:-1] parsed[k] = v return parsed class digestauthserver(object): def __init__(self): self._user_hashes = {} def gethashers(self): def _md5sum(x): m = hashlib.md5() m.update(x) return node.hex(m.digest()) h = _md5sum kd = lambda s, d, h=h: h(b"%s:%s" % (s, d)) return h, kd def adduser(self, user, password, realm): h, kd = self.gethashers() a1 = h(b'%s:%s:%s' % (user, realm, password)) self._user_hashes[(user, realm)] = a1 def makechallenge(self, realm): # We aren't testing the protocol here, just that the bytes make the # proper round trip. So hardcoded seems fine. nonce = b'064af982c5b571cea6450d8eda91c20d' return b'realm="%s", nonce="%s", algorithm=MD5, qop="auth"' % ( realm, nonce, ) def checkauth(self, req, header): log = req.rawenv[b'wsgi.errors'] h, kd = self.gethashers() resp = parse_keqv_list(req, header.split(b', ')) if resp.get(b'algorithm', b'MD5').upper() != b'MD5': log.write(b'Unsupported algorithm: %s' % resp.get(b'algorithm')) raise common.ErrorResponse( common.HTTP_FORBIDDEN, b"unknown algorithm" ) user = resp[b'username'] realm = resp[b'realm'] nonce = resp[b'nonce'] ha1 = self._user_hashes.get((user, realm)) if not ha1: log.write(b'No hash found for user/realm "%s/%s"' % (user, realm)) raise common.ErrorResponse(common.HTTP_FORBIDDEN, b"bad user") qop = resp.get(b'qop', b'auth') if qop != b'auth': log.write(b"Unsupported qop: %s" % qop) raise common.ErrorResponse(common.HTTP_FORBIDDEN, b"bad qop") cnonce, ncvalue = resp.get(b'cnonce'), resp.get(b'nc') if not cnonce or not ncvalue: log.write(b'No cnonce (%s) or ncvalue (%s)' % (cnonce, ncvalue)) raise common.ErrorResponse(common.HTTP_FORBIDDEN, b"no cnonce") a2 = b'%s:%s' % (req.method, resp[b'uri']) noncebit = b"%s:%s:%s:%s:%s" % (nonce, ncvalue, cnonce, qop, h(a2)) respdig = kd(ha1, noncebit) if respdig != resp[b'response']: log.write( b'User/realm "%s/%s" gave %s, but expected %s' % (user, realm, resp[b'response'], respdig) ) return False return True digest = digestauthserver() def perform_authentication(hgweb, req, op): auth = req.headers.get(b'Authorization') if req.headers.get(b'X-HgTest-AuthType') == b'Digest': if not auth: challenge = digest.makechallenge(b'mercurial') raise common.ErrorResponse( common.HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, b'who', [(b'WWW-Authenticate', b'Digest %s' % challenge)], ) if not digest.checkauth(req, auth[7:]): raise common.ErrorResponse(common.HTTP_FORBIDDEN, b'no') return if not auth: raise common.ErrorResponse( common.HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, b'who', [(b'WWW-Authenticate', b'Basic Realm="mercurial"')], ) if base64.b64decode(auth.split()[1]).split(b':', 1) != [b'user', b'pass']: raise common.ErrorResponse(common.HTTP_FORBIDDEN, b'no') def extsetup(ui): common.permhooks.insert(0, perform_authentication) digest.adduser(b'user', b'pass', b'mercurial')