remove: fix --force option help description (
issue5177)
Before this commit --force option help description stated
that file was removed and deleted even if file was added
or modified which is not true. Force option removes added
file only from dirstate, it doesn't delete it from the
filesystem.
# sslutil.py - SSL handling for mercurial
#
# Copyright 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
# Copyright 2006, 2007 Alexis S. L. Carvalho <alexis@cecm.usp.br>
# Copyright 2006 Vadim Gelfer <vadim.gelfer@gmail.com>
#
# This software may be used and distributed according to the terms of the
# GNU General Public License version 2 or any later version.
from __future__ import absolute_import
import os
import ssl
import sys
from .i18n import _
from . import (
error,
util,
)
# Python 2.7.9+ overhauled the built-in SSL/TLS features of Python. It added
# support for TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, SNI, system CA stores, etc. These features are
# all exposed via the "ssl" module.
#
# Depending on the version of Python being used, SSL/TLS support is either
# modern/secure or legacy/insecure. Many operations in this module have
# separate code paths depending on support in Python.
hassni = getattr(ssl, 'HAS_SNI', False)
try:
OP_NO_SSLv2 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2
OP_NO_SSLv3 = ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3
except AttributeError:
OP_NO_SSLv2 = 0x1000000
OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x2000000
try:
# ssl.SSLContext was added in 2.7.9 and presence indicates modern
# SSL/TLS features are available.
SSLContext = ssl.SSLContext
modernssl = True
_canloaddefaultcerts = util.safehasattr(SSLContext, 'load_default_certs')
except AttributeError:
modernssl = False
_canloaddefaultcerts = False
# We implement SSLContext using the interface from the standard library.
class SSLContext(object):
# ssl.wrap_socket gained the "ciphers" named argument in 2.7.
_supportsciphers = sys.version_info >= (2, 7)
def __init__(self, protocol):
# From the public interface of SSLContext
self.protocol = protocol
self.check_hostname = False
self.options = 0
self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
# Used by our implementation.
self._certfile = None
self._keyfile = None
self._certpassword = None
self._cacerts = None
self._ciphers = None
def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None):
self._certfile = certfile
self._keyfile = keyfile
self._certpassword = password
def load_default_certs(self, purpose=None):
pass
def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None):
if capath:
raise error.Abort('capath not supported')
if cadata:
raise error.Abort('cadata not supported')
self._cacerts = cafile
def set_ciphers(self, ciphers):
if not self._supportsciphers:
raise error.Abort('setting ciphers not supported')
self._ciphers = ciphers
def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False):
# server_hostname is unique to SSLContext.wrap_socket and is used
# for SNI in that context. So there's nothing for us to do with it
# in this legacy code since we don't support SNI.
args = {
'keyfile': self._keyfile,
'certfile': self._certfile,
'server_side': server_side,
'cert_reqs': self.verify_mode,
'ssl_version': self.protocol,
'ca_certs': self._cacerts,
}
if self._supportsciphers:
args['ciphers'] = self._ciphers
return ssl.wrap_socket(socket, **args)
def wrapsocket(sock, keyfile, certfile, ui, cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE,
ca_certs=None, serverhostname=None):
"""Add SSL/TLS to a socket.
This is a glorified wrapper for ``ssl.wrap_socket()``. It makes sane
choices based on what security options are available.
In addition to the arguments supported by ``ssl.wrap_socket``, we allow
the following additional arguments:
* serverhostname - The expected hostname of the remote server. If the
server (and client) support SNI, this tells the server which certificate
to use.
"""
if not serverhostname:
raise error.Abort('serverhostname argument required')
# Despite its name, PROTOCOL_SSLv23 selects the highest protocol
# that both ends support, including TLS protocols. On legacy stacks,
# the highest it likely goes in TLS 1.0. On modern stacks, it can
# support TLS 1.2.
#
# The PROTOCOL_TLSv* constants select a specific TLS version
# only (as opposed to multiple versions). So the method for
# supporting multiple TLS versions is to use PROTOCOL_SSLv23 and
# disable protocols via SSLContext.options and OP_NO_* constants.
# However, SSLContext.options doesn't work unless we have the
# full/real SSLContext available to us.
#
# SSLv2 and SSLv3 are broken. We ban them outright.
if modernssl:
protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23
else:
protocol = ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1
# TODO use ssl.create_default_context() on modernssl.
sslcontext = SSLContext(protocol)
# This is a no-op on old Python.
sslcontext.options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 | OP_NO_SSLv3
# This still works on our fake SSLContext.
sslcontext.verify_mode = cert_reqs
if certfile is not None:
def password():
f = keyfile or certfile
return ui.getpass(_('passphrase for %s: ') % f, '')
sslcontext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, password)
if ca_certs is not None:
sslcontext.load_verify_locations(cafile=ca_certs)
else:
# This is a no-op on old Python.
sslcontext.load_default_certs()
sslsocket = sslcontext.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=serverhostname)
# check if wrap_socket failed silently because socket had been
# closed
# - see http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
if not sslsocket.cipher():
raise error.Abort(_('ssl connection failed'))
return sslsocket
def _verifycert(cert, hostname):
'''Verify that cert (in socket.getpeercert() format) matches hostname.
CRLs is not handled.
Returns error message if any problems are found and None on success.
'''
if not cert:
return _('no certificate received')
dnsname = hostname.lower()
def matchdnsname(certname):
return (certname == dnsname or
'.' in dnsname and certname == '*.' + dnsname.split('.', 1)[1])
san = cert.get('subjectAltName', [])
if san:
certnames = [value.lower() for key, value in san if key == 'DNS']
for name in certnames:
if matchdnsname(name):
return None
if certnames:
return _('certificate is for %s') % ', '.join(certnames)
# subject is only checked when subjectAltName is empty
for s in cert.get('subject', []):
key, value = s[0]
if key == 'commonName':
try:
# 'subject' entries are unicode
certname = value.lower().encode('ascii')
except UnicodeEncodeError:
return _('IDN in certificate not supported')
if matchdnsname(certname):
return None
return _('certificate is for %s') % certname
return _('no commonName or subjectAltName found in certificate')
# CERT_REQUIRED means fetch the cert from the server all the time AND
# validate it against the CA store provided in web.cacerts.
def _plainapplepython():
"""return true if this seems to be a pure Apple Python that
* is unfrozen and presumably has the whole mercurial module in the file
system
* presumably is an Apple Python that uses Apple OpenSSL which has patches
for using system certificate store CAs in addition to the provided
cacerts file
"""
if sys.platform != 'darwin' or util.mainfrozen() or not sys.executable:
return False
exe = os.path.realpath(sys.executable).lower()
return (exe.startswith('/usr/bin/python') or
exe.startswith('/system/library/frameworks/python.framework/'))
def _defaultcacerts():
"""return path to CA certificates; None for system's store; ! to disable"""
if _plainapplepython():
dummycert = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'dummycert.pem')
if os.path.exists(dummycert):
return dummycert
if _canloaddefaultcerts:
return None
return '!'
def sslkwargs(ui, host):
kws = {'ui': ui}
hostfingerprint = ui.config('hostfingerprints', host)
if hostfingerprint:
return kws
cacerts = ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
if cacerts == '!':
pass
elif cacerts:
cacerts = util.expandpath(cacerts)
if not os.path.exists(cacerts):
raise error.Abort(_('could not find web.cacerts: %s') % cacerts)
else:
cacerts = _defaultcacerts()
if cacerts and cacerts != '!':
ui.debug('using %s to enable OS X system CA\n' % cacerts)
ui.setconfig('web', 'cacerts', cacerts, 'defaultcacerts')
if cacerts != '!':
kws.update({'ca_certs': cacerts,
'cert_reqs': ssl.CERT_REQUIRED,
})
return kws
class validator(object):
def __init__(self, ui, host):
self.ui = ui
self.host = host
def __call__(self, sock, strict=False):
host = self.host
if not sock.cipher(): # work around http://bugs.python.org/issue13721
raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
try:
peercert = sock.getpeercert(True)
peercert2 = sock.getpeercert()
except AttributeError:
raise error.Abort(_('%s ssl connection error') % host)
if not peercert:
raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: '
'no certificate received') % host)
# If a certificate fingerprint is pinned, use it and only it to
# validate the remote cert.
hostfingerprints = self.ui.configlist('hostfingerprints', host)
peerfingerprint = util.sha1(peercert).hexdigest()
nicefingerprint = ":".join([peerfingerprint[x:x + 2]
for x in xrange(0, len(peerfingerprint), 2)])
if hostfingerprints:
fingerprintmatch = False
for hostfingerprint in hostfingerprints:
if peerfingerprint.lower() == \
hostfingerprint.replace(':', '').lower():
fingerprintmatch = True
break
if not fingerprintmatch:
raise error.Abort(_('certificate for %s has unexpected '
'fingerprint %s') % (host, nicefingerprint),
hint=_('check hostfingerprint configuration'))
self.ui.debug('%s certificate matched fingerprint %s\n' %
(host, nicefingerprint))
return
# No pinned fingerprint. Establish trust by looking at the CAs.
cacerts = self.ui.config('web', 'cacerts')
if cacerts != '!':
msg = _verifycert(peercert2, host)
if msg:
raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate error: %s') % (host, msg),
hint=_('configure hostfingerprint %s or use '
'--insecure to connect insecurely') %
nicefingerprint)
self.ui.debug('%s certificate successfully verified\n' % host)
elif strict:
raise error.Abort(_('%s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
'verified') % (host, nicefingerprint),
hint=_('check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts '
'config setting'))
else:
self.ui.warn(_('warning: %s certificate with fingerprint %s not '
'verified (check hostfingerprints or web.cacerts '
'config setting)\n') %
(host, nicefingerprint))