view mercurial/mpatch.h @ 31290:f819aa9dbbf9

sslutil: issue warning when [hostfingerprint] is used

Mercurial 3.9 added the [hostsecurity] section, which is better
than [hostfingerprints] in every way.

One of the ways that [hostsecurity] is better is that it supports
SHA-256 and SHA-512 fingerprints, not just SHA-1 fingerprints.

The world is moving away from SHA-1 because it is borderline
secure. Mercurial should be part of that movement.

This patch adds a warning when a valid SHA-1 fingerprint from
the [hostfingerprints] section is being used. The warning informs
users to switch to [hostsecurity]. It even prints the config
option they should set. It uses the SHA-256 fingerprint because
recommending a SHA-1 fingerprint in 2017 would be ill-advised.

The warning will print itself on every connection to a server until
it is fixed. There is no way to suppress the warning. I admit this
is annoying. But given the security implications of sticking with
SHA-1, I think this is justified. If this patch is accepted,
I'll likely send a follow-up to start warning on SHA-1
certificates in [hostsecurity] as well. Then sometime down
the road, we can drop support for SHA-1 fingerprints.

Credit for this idea comes from timeless in issue 5466.

#ifndef _HG_MPATCH_H_
#define _HG_MPATCH_H_

#define MPATCH_ERR_NO_MEM -3
#define MPATCH_ERR_CANNOT_BE_DECODED -2
#define MPATCH_ERR_INVALID_PATCH -1

struct mpatch_frag {
	int start, end, len;
	const char *data;
};

struct mpatch_flist {
	struct mpatch_frag *base, *head, *tail;
};

int mpatch_decode(const char *bin, ssize_t len, struct mpatch_flist** res);
ssize_t mpatch_calcsize(ssize_t len, struct mpatch_flist *l);
void mpatch_lfree(struct mpatch_flist *a);
int mpatch_apply(char *buf, const char *orig, ssize_t len,
	struct mpatch_flist *l);
struct mpatch_flist *mpatch_fold(void *bins,
	struct mpatch_flist* (*get_next_item)(void*, ssize_t),
	ssize_t start, ssize_t end);

#endif