Mercurial > hg
view tests/test-audit-path.t @ 37048:fc5e261915b9
wireproto: require POST for all HTTPv2 requests
Wire protocol version 1 transfers argument data via request
headers by default. This has historically caused problems because
servers institute limits on the length of individual HTTP headers
as well as the total size of all request headers. Mercurial servers
can advertise the maximum length of an individual header. But
there's no guarantee any intermediate HTTP agents will accept
headers up to that length.
In the existing wire protocol, server operators typically also
key off the HTTP request method to implement authentication.
For example, GET requests translate to read-only requests and
can be allowed. But read-write commands must use POST and require
authentication. This has typically worked because the only wire
protocol commands that use POST modify the repo (e.g. the
"unbundle" command).
There is an experimental feature to enable clients to transmit
argument data via POST request bodies. This is technically a
better and more robust solution. But we can't enable it by default
because of servers assuming POST means write access.
In version 2 of the wire protocol, the permissions of a request
are encoded in the URL. And with it being a new protocol in a new
URL space, we're not constrained by backwards compatibility
requirements.
This commit adopts the technically superior mechanism of using
HTTP request bodies to send argument data by requiring POST for
all commands. Strictly speaking, it may be possible to send
request bodies on GET requests. But my experience is that not all
HTTP stacks support this. POST pretty much always works. Using POST
for read-only operations does sacrifice some RESTful design
purity. But this API cares about practicality, not about being
in Roy T. Fielding's REST ivory tower.
There's a chance we may relax this restriction in the future. But
for now, I want to see how far we can get with a POST only API.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D2837
author | Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> |
---|---|
date | Tue, 13 Mar 2018 11:57:43 -0700 |
parents | 4441705b7111 |
children | 656ac240f392 |
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$ hg init audit of .hg $ hg add .hg/00changelog.i abort: path contains illegal component: .hg/00changelog.i [255] #if symlink Symlinks $ mkdir a $ echo a > a/a $ hg ci -Ama adding a/a $ ln -s a b $ echo b > a/b $ hg add b/b abort: path 'b/b' traverses symbolic link 'b' [255] $ hg add b should still fail - maybe $ hg add b/b abort: path 'b/b' traverses symbolic link 'b' [255] $ hg commit -m 'add symlink b' Test symlink traversing when accessing history: ----------------------------------------------- (build a changeset where the path exists as a directory) $ hg up 0 0 files updated, 0 files merged, 1 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ mkdir b $ echo c > b/a $ hg add b/a $ hg ci -m 'add directory b' created new head Test that hg cat does not do anything wrong the working copy has 'b' as directory $ hg cat b/a c $ hg cat -r "desc(directory)" b/a c $ hg cat -r "desc(symlink)" b/a b/a: no such file in rev bc151a1f53bd [1] Test that hg cat does not do anything wrong the working copy has 'b' as a symlink (issue4749) $ hg up 'desc(symlink)' 1 files updated, 0 files merged, 1 files removed, 0 files unresolved $ hg cat b/a b/a: no such file in rev bc151a1f53bd [1] $ hg cat -r "desc(directory)" b/a c $ hg cat -r "desc(symlink)" b/a b/a: no such file in rev bc151a1f53bd [1] #endif unbundle tampered bundle $ hg init target $ cd target $ hg unbundle "$TESTDIR/bundles/tampered.hg" adding changesets adding manifests adding file changes added 5 changesets with 6 changes to 6 files (+4 heads) new changesets b7da9bf6b037:fc1393d727bc (run 'hg heads' to see heads, 'hg merge' to merge) attack .hg/test $ hg manifest -r0 .hg/test $ hg update -Cr0 abort: path contains illegal component: .hg/test [255] attack foo/.hg/test $ hg manifest -r1 foo/.hg/test $ hg update -Cr1 abort: path 'foo/.hg/test' is inside nested repo 'foo' [255] attack back/test where back symlinks to .. $ hg manifest -r2 back back/test #if symlink $ hg update -Cr2 abort: path 'back/test' traverses symbolic link 'back' [255] #else ('back' will be a file and cause some other system specific error) $ hg update -Cr2 back: is both a file and a directory abort: * (glob) [255] #endif attack ../test $ hg manifest -r3 ../test $ mkdir ../test $ echo data > ../test/file $ hg update -Cr3 abort: path contains illegal component: ../test [255] $ cat ../test/file data attack /tmp/test $ hg manifest -r4 /tmp/test $ hg update -Cr4 abort: path contains illegal component: /tmp/test [255] $ cd .. Test symlink traversal on merge: -------------------------------- #if symlink set up symlink hell $ mkdir merge-symlink-out $ hg init merge-symlink $ cd merge-symlink $ touch base $ hg commit -qAm base $ ln -s ../merge-symlink-out a $ hg commit -qAm 'symlink a -> ../merge-symlink-out' $ hg up -q 0 $ mkdir a $ touch a/poisoned $ hg commit -qAm 'file a/poisoned' $ hg log -G -T '{rev}: {desc}\n' @ 2: file a/poisoned | | o 1: symlink a -> ../merge-symlink-out |/ o 0: base try trivial merge $ hg up -qC 1 $ hg merge 2 abort: path 'a/poisoned' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] try rebase onto other revision: cache of audited paths should be discarded, and the rebase should fail (issue5628) $ hg up -qC 2 $ hg rebase -s 2 -d 1 --config extensions.rebase= rebasing 2:e73c21d6b244 "file a/poisoned" (tip) abort: path 'a/poisoned' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] $ ls ../merge-symlink-out $ cd .. Test symlink traversal on update: --------------------------------- $ mkdir update-symlink-out $ hg init update-symlink $ cd update-symlink $ ln -s ../update-symlink-out a $ hg commit -qAm 'symlink a -> ../update-symlink-out' $ hg rm a $ mkdir a && touch a/b $ hg ci -qAm 'file a/b' a/b $ hg up -qC 0 $ hg rm a $ mkdir a && touch a/c $ hg ci -qAm 'rm a, file a/c' $ hg log -G -T '{rev}: {desc}\n' @ 2: rm a, file a/c | | o 1: file a/b |/ o 0: symlink a -> ../update-symlink-out try linear update where symlink already exists: $ hg up -qC 0 $ hg up 1 abort: path 'a/b' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] try linear update including symlinked directory and its content: paths are audited first by calculateupdates(), where no symlink is created so both 'a' and 'a/b' are taken as good paths. still applyupdates() should fail. $ hg up -qC null $ hg up 1 abort: path 'a/b' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] $ ls ../update-symlink-out try branch update replacing directory with symlink, and its content: the path 'a' is audited as a directory first, which should be audited again as a symlink. $ rm -f a $ hg up -qC 2 $ hg up 1 abort: path 'a/b' traverses symbolic link 'a' [255] $ ls ../update-symlink-out $ cd .. #endif