Mike Hommey <mh@glandium.org> [Thu, 10 Aug 2017 20:47:19 -0700] rev 33663
branchmap: revert
c34532365b38 for Python 2.7 compatibility
Old versions of python 2.7 don't like that the second argument to
struct.unpack_from is a bytearray, so the change removing the util.buffer
around that argument in branchmap broke running on older versions of python
2.7.
Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D330
Augie Fackler <raf@durin42.com> [Thu, 10 Aug 2017 18:46:55 -0400] rev 33662
Added signature for changeset
3fee7f7d2da0
Augie Fackler <raf@durin42.com> [Thu, 10 Aug 2017 18:46:54 -0400] rev 33661
Added tag 4.3.1 for changeset
3fee7f7d2da0
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Mon, 07 Aug 2017 22:22:28 +0900] rev 33660
ssh: unban the use of pipe character in user@host:port string
This vulnerability was fixed by the previous patch and there were more ways
to exploit than using '|shellcmd'. So it doesn't make sense to reject only
pipe character.
Test cases are updated to actually try to exploit the bug. As the SSH bridge
of git/svn subrepos are not managed by our code, the tests for non-hg subrepos
are just removed.
This may be folded into the original patches.
Jun Wu <quark@fb.com> [Fri, 04 Aug 2017 23:54:12 -0700] rev 33659
ssh: quote parameters using shellquote (SEC)
This patch uses shellquote to quote ssh parameters more strictly to avoid
shell injection.
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 14:55:11 -0700] rev 33658
subrepo: add tests for git rogue ssh urls (SEC)
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh
command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with
'-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In
addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary
commands.
When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that
they can inspect what's going on.
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:44:17 -0700] rev 33657
subrepo: add tests for svn rogue ssh urls (SEC)
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh
command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with
'-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In
addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary
commands.
When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that
they can inspect what's going on.
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:04:44 -0700] rev 33656
subrepo: add tests for hg rogue ssh urls (SEC)
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh
command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with
'-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In
addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary
commands.
When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that
they can inspect what's going on.
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Mon, 31 Jul 2017 14:40:28 -0700] rev 33655
push: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC)
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:47:32 -0700] rev 33654
pull: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC)
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:36:36 -0700] rev 33653
clone: add tests for unsafe ssh url (SEC)
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Tue, 01 Aug 2017 14:40:19 -0700] rev 33652
sshpeer: check for safe ssh url (SEC)
Checking in the sshpeer for a rogue ssh:// urls seems like the right
place to do it (instead of whack-a-mole with pull, clone, push, etc).
Augie Fackler <augie@google.com> [Fri, 04 Aug 2017 14:00:03 -0400] rev 33651
ssh: ban any username@host or host that starts with - (SEC)
This paranoia probably isn't required, but it can't hurt either.
Sean Farley <sean@farley.io> [Fri, 28 Jul 2017 16:32:25 -0700] rev 33650
util: add utility method to check for bad ssh urls (SEC)
Our use of SSH has an exploit that will parse the first part of an url
blindly as a hostname. Prior to this set of security patches, a url
with '-oProxyCommand' could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In
addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' can be abused to execute
arbitrary commands in a similar fashion.
We defend against this by checking ssh:// URLs and looking for a
hostname that starts with a - or contains a |.
When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so
that they can inspect what's going on.