Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:40:40 -0800] rev 30768
tests: use `hg help dates` instead of `hg help revs` in test
The revisions help is already long and will get longer, so switch to
another short and stable topic.
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:28:54 -0800] rev 30767
help: use a single paragraph to describe full and abbreviated nodeids
The texts describing 40-digit strings and the abbreviated form are
closely related, so make it a single paragraph.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 10 Jan 2017 23:37:08 -0800] rev 30766
hgweb: support Content Security Policy
Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a web security feature that allows
servers to declare what loaded content is allowed to do. For example,
a policy can prevent loading of images, JavaScript, CSS, etc unless
the source of that content is whitelisted (by hostname, URI scheme,
hashes of content, etc). It's a nifty security feature that provides
extra mitigation against some attacks, notably XSS.
Mitigation against these attacks is important for Mercurial because
hgweb renders repository data, which is commonly untrusted. While we
make attempts to escape things, etc, there's the possibility that
malicious data could be injected into the site content. If this happens
today, the full power of the web browser is available to that
malicious content. A restrictive CSP policy (defined by the server
operator and sent in an HTTP header which is outside the control of
malicious content), could restrict browser capabilities and mitigate
security problems posed by malicious data.
CSP works by emitting an HTTP header declaring the policy that browsers
should apply. Ideally, this header would be emitted by a layer above
Mercurial (likely the HTTP server doing the WSGI "proxying"). This
works for some CSP policies, but not all.
For example, policies to allow inline JavaScript may require setting
a "nonce" attribute on <script>. This attribute value must be unique
and non-guessable. And, the value must be present in the HTTP header
and the HTML body. This means that coordinating the value between
Mercurial and another HTTP server could be difficult: it is much
easier to generate and emit the nonce in a central location.
This commit introduces support for emitting a
Content-Security-Policy header from hgweb. A config option defines
the header value. If present, the header is emitted. A special
"%nonce%" syntax in the value triggers generation of a nonce and
inclusion in <script> elements in templates. The inclusion of a
nonce does not occur unless "%nonce%" is present. This makes this
commit completely backwards compatible and the feature opt-in.
The nonce is a type 4 UUID, which is the flavor that is randomly
generated. It has 122 random bits, which should be plenty to satisfy
the guarantees of a nonce.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 10 Jan 2017 20:47:48 -0800] rev 30765
hgweb: call process_dates() via DOM event listener
All the hgweb templates include mercurial.js in their header. All
the hgweb templates have the same <script> boilerplate to run
process_dates(). This patch factors that function call into
mercurial.js as part of a DOMContentLoaded event listener.