Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:40:40 -0800] rev 30768
tests: use `hg help dates` instead of `hg help revs` in test
The revisions help is already long and will get longer, so switch to
another short and stable topic.
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:28:54 -0800] rev 30767
help: use a single paragraph to describe full and abbreviated nodeids
The texts describing 40-digit strings and the abbreviated form are
closely related, so make it a single paragraph.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 10 Jan 2017 23:37:08 -0800] rev 30766
hgweb: support Content Security Policy
Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a web security feature that allows
servers to declare what loaded content is allowed to do. For example,
a policy can prevent loading of images, JavaScript, CSS, etc unless
the source of that content is whitelisted (by hostname, URI scheme,
hashes of content, etc). It's a nifty security feature that provides
extra mitigation against some attacks, notably XSS.
Mitigation against these attacks is important for Mercurial because
hgweb renders repository data, which is commonly untrusted. While we
make attempts to escape things, etc, there's the possibility that
malicious data could be injected into the site content. If this happens
today, the full power of the web browser is available to that
malicious content. A restrictive CSP policy (defined by the server
operator and sent in an HTTP header which is outside the control of
malicious content), could restrict browser capabilities and mitigate
security problems posed by malicious data.
CSP works by emitting an HTTP header declaring the policy that browsers
should apply. Ideally, this header would be emitted by a layer above
Mercurial (likely the HTTP server doing the WSGI "proxying"). This
works for some CSP policies, but not all.
For example, policies to allow inline JavaScript may require setting
a "nonce" attribute on <script>. This attribute value must be unique
and non-guessable. And, the value must be present in the HTTP header
and the HTML body. This means that coordinating the value between
Mercurial and another HTTP server could be difficult: it is much
easier to generate and emit the nonce in a central location.
This commit introduces support for emitting a
Content-Security-Policy header from hgweb. A config option defines
the header value. If present, the header is emitted. A special
"%nonce%" syntax in the value triggers generation of a nonce and
inclusion in <script> elements in templates. The inclusion of a
nonce does not occur unless "%nonce%" is present. This makes this
commit completely backwards compatible and the feature opt-in.
The nonce is a type 4 UUID, which is the flavor that is randomly
generated. It has 122 random bits, which should be plenty to satisfy
the guarantees of a nonce.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 10 Jan 2017 20:47:48 -0800] rev 30765
hgweb: call process_dates() via DOM event listener
All the hgweb templates include mercurial.js in their header. All
the hgweb templates have the same <script> boilerplate to run
process_dates(). This patch factors that function call into
mercurial.js as part of a DOMContentLoaded event listener.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 15:29:32 -0700] rev 30764
protocol: send application/mercurial-0.2 responses to capable clients
With this commit, the HTTP transport now parses the X-HgProto-<N>
header to determine what media type and compression engine to use for
responses. So far, we only compress responses that are already being
compressed with zlib today (stream response types to specific
commands). We can expand things to cover additional response types
later.
The practical side-effect of this commit is that non-zlib compression
engines will be used if both ends support them. This means if both
ends have zstd support, zstd - not zlib - will be used to compress
data!
When cloning the mozilla-unified repository between a local HTTP
server and client, the benefits of non-zlib compression are quite
noticeable:
engine server CPU (s) client CPU (s) bundle size
zlib (l=6) 174.1 283.2 1,148,547,026
zstd (l=1) 99.2 267.3 1,127,513,841
zstd (l=3) 103.1 266.9 1,018,861,363
zstd (l=7) 128.3 269.7 919,190,278
zstd (l=10) 162.0 - 894,547,179
none 95.3 277.2 4,097,566,064
The default zstd compression level is 3. So if you deploy zstd
capable Mercurial to your clients and servers and CPU time on
your server is dominated by "getbundle" requests (clients cloning
and pulling) - and my experience at Mozilla tells me this is often
the case - this commit could drastically reduce your server-side
CPU usage *and* save on bandwidth costs!
Another benefit of this change is that server operators can install
*any* compression engine. While it isn't enabled by default, the
"none" compression engine can now be used to disable wire protocol
compression completely. Previously, commands like "getbundle" always
zlib compressed output, adding considerable overhead to generating
responses. If you are on a high speed network and your server is under
high load, it might be advantageous to trade bandwidth for CPU.
Although, zstd at level 1 doesn't use that much CPU, so I'm not
convinced that disabling compression wholesale is worthwhile. And, my
data seems to indicate a slow down on the client without compression.
I suspect this is due to a lack of buffering resulting in an increase
in socket read() calls and/or the fact we're transferring an extra 3 GB
of data (parsing HTTP chunked transfer and processing extra TCP packets
can add up). This is definitely worth investigating and optimizing. But
since the "none" compressor isn't enabled by default, I'm inclined to
punt on this issue.
This commit introduces tons of tests. Some of these should arguably
have been implemented on previous commits. But it was difficult to
test without the server functionality in place.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 15:22:18 -0700] rev 30763
httppeer: advertise and support application/mercurial-0.2
Now that servers expose a capability indicating they support
application/mercurial-0.2 and compression, clients can key off
this to say they support responses that are compressed with
various compression formats.
After this commit, the HTTP wire protocol client now sends an
"X-HgProto-<N>" request header indicating its support for
"application/mercurial-0.2" media type and various compression
formats.
This commit also implements support for handling
"application/mercurial-0.2" responses. It simply reads the header
compression engine identifier then routes the remainder of the
response to the appropriate decompressor.
There were some test changes, but only to logging. That points to
an obvious gap in our test coverage. This will be addressed in a
subsequent commit once server support is in place (it is hard to
test without server support).
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 15:21:46 -0700] rev 30762
wireproto: advertise supported media types and compression formats
This commit introduces support for advertising a server's support for
media types and compression formats in accordance with the spec defined
in internals.wireproto.
The bulk of the new code is a helper function in wireproto.py to
obtain a prioritized list of compression engines available to the
wire protocol. While not utilized yet, we implement support
for obtaining the list of compression engines advertised by the
client.
The upcoming HTTP protocol enhancements are a bit lower-level than
existing tests (most existing tests are command centric). So,
this commit establishes a new test file that will be appropriate
for holding tests around the functionality of the HTTP protocol
itself.
Rounding out this change, `hg debuginstall` now prints compression
engines available to the server.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 13:51:12 -0700] rev 30761
util: declare wire protocol support of compression engines
This patch implements a new compression engine API allowing
compression engines to declare support for the wire protocol.
Support is declared by returning a compression format string
identifier that will be added to payloads to signal the compression
type of data that follows and default integer priorities of the
engine.
Accessor methods have been added to the compression engine manager
class to facilitate use.
Note that the "none" and "bz2" engines declare wire protocol support
but aren't enabled by default due to their priorities being 0. It
is essentially free from a coding perspective to support these
compression formats, so we do it in case anyone may derive use from
it.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 13:56:36 -0700] rev 30760
internals: document compression negotiation
As part of adding zstd support to all of the things, we'll need
to teach the wire protocol to support non-zlib compression formats.
This commit documents how we'll implement that.
To understand how we arrived at this proposal, let's look at how
things are done today.
The wire protocol today doesn't have a unified format. Instead,
there is a limited facility for differentiating replies as successful
or not. And, each command essentially defines its own response format.
A significant deficiency in the current protocol is the lack of
payload framing over the SSH transport. In the HTTP transport,
chunked transfer is used and the end of an HTTP response body (and
the end of a Mercurial command response) can be identified by a 0
length chunk. This is how HTTP chunked transfer works. But in the
SSH transport, there is no such framing, at least for certain
responses (notably the response to "getbundle" requests). Clients
can't simply read until end of stream because the socket is
persistent and reused for multiple requests. Clients need to know
when they've encountered the end of a request but there is nothing
simple for them to key off of to detect this. So what happens is
the client must decode the payload (as opposed to being dumb and
forwarding frames/packets). This means the payload itself needs
to support identifying end of stream. In some cases (bundle2), it
also means the payload can encode "error" or "interrupt" events
telling the client to e.g. abort processing. The lack of framing
on the SSH transport and the transfer of its responsibilities to
e.g. bundle2 is a massive layering violation and a wart on the
protocol architecture. It needs to be fixed someday by inventing a
proper framing protocol.
So about compression.
The client transport abstractions have a "_callcompressable()"
API. This API is called to invoke a remote command that will
send a compressible response. The response is essentially a
"streaming" response (no framing data at the Mercurial layer)
that is fed into a decompressor.
On the HTTP transport, the decompressor is zlib and only zlib.
There is currently no mechanism for the client to specify an
alternate compression format. And, clients don't advertise what
compression formats they support or ask the server to send a
specific compression format. Instead, it is assumed that non-error
responses to "compressible" commands are zlib compressed.
On the SSH transport, there is no compression at the Mercurial
protocol layer. Instead, compression must be handled by SSH
itself (e.g. `ssh -C`) or within the payload data (e.g. bundle
compression).
For the HTTP transport, adding new compression formats is pretty
straightforward. Once you know what decompressor to use, you can
stream data into the decompressor until you reach a 0 size HTTP
chunk, at which point you are at end of stream.
So our wire protocol changes for the HTTP transport are pretty
straightforward: the client and server advertise what compression
formats they support and an appropriate compression format is
chosen. We introduce a new HTTP media type to hold compressed
payloads. The header of the payload defines the compression format
being used. Whoever is on the receiving end can sniff the first few
bytes route to an appropriate decompressor.
Support for multiple compression formats is advertised on both
server and client. The server advertises a "compression" capability
saying which compression formats it supports and in what order they
are preferred. Clients advertise their support for multiple
compression formats and media types via the introduced "X-HgProto"
request header.
Strictly speaking, servers don't need to advertise which compression
formats they support. But doing so allows clients to fail fast if
they don't support any of the formats the server does. This is useful
in situations like sending bundles, where the client may have to
perform expensive computation before sending data to the server.
Rather than simply advertise a list of supported compression formats,
we introduce an additional "httpmediatype" server capability
advertising which media types the server supports. This means servers
are explicit about what formats they exchange. IMO, this is superior
to inferring support from other capabilities (like "compression").
By advertising compression support on each request in the "X-HgProto"
header and media type and direction at the server level, we are able
to gradually transition existing commands/responses to the new media
type and possibly compression. Contrast with the old world, where we
only supported a single media type and the use of compression was
built-in to the semantics of the command on both client and server.
In the new world, if "application/mercurial-0.2" is supported,
compression is supported. It's that simple.
It's worth noting that we explicitly don't use "Accept,"
"Accept-Encoding," "Content-Encoding," or "Transfer-Encoding" for
content negotiation and compression. People knowledgeable of the HTTP
specifications will say that we should use these because that's
what they are designed to be used for. They have a point and I
sympathize with the argument. Earlier versions of this commit even
defined supported media types in the "Accept" header. However, my
years of experience rolling out services leveraging HTTP has taught
me to not trust the HTTP layer, especially if you are going outside
the normal spec (such as using a custom "Content-Encoding" value to
represent zstd streams). I've seen load balancers, proxies, and other
network devices do very bad and unexpected things to HTTP messages
(like insisting zlib compressed content is decoded and then re-encoded
at a different compression level or even stripping compression
completely). I've found that the best way to avoid surprises when
writing protocols on top of HTTP is to use HTTP as a dumb transport as
much as possible to minimize the chances that an "intelligent" agent
between endpoints will muck with your data. While the widespread use of
TLS is mitigating many intermediate network agents interfering with
HTTP, there are still problems at the edges, with e.g. the origin HTTP
server needing to convert HTTP to and from WSGI and buggy or
feature-lacking HTTP client implementations. I've found the best way to
avoid these problems is to avoid using headers like "Content-Encoding"
and to bake as much logic as possible into media types and HTTP message
bodies. The protocol changes in this commit do rely on a custom HTTP
request header and the "Content-Type" headers. But we used them before,
so we shouldn't be increasing our exposure to "bad" HTTP agents.
For the SSH transport, we can't easily implement content negotiation
to determine compression formats because the SSH transport has no
content negotiation capabilities today. And without a framing protocol,
we don't know how much data to feed into a decompressor. So in order
to implement compression support on the SSH transport, we'd need to
invent a mechanism to represent content types and an outer framing
protocol to stream data robustly. While I'm fully capable of doing
that, it is a lot of work and not something that should be undertaken
lightly. My opinion is that if we're going to change the SSH transport
protocol, we should take a long hard look at implementing a grand
unified protocol that attempts to address all the deficiencies with
the existing protocol. While I want this to happen, that would be
massive scope bloat standing in the way of zstd support. So, I've
decided to take the easy solution: the SSH transport will not gain
support for multiple compression formats. Keep in mind it doesn't
support *any* compression today. So essentially nothing is changing
on the SSH front.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 14:46:02 -0700] rev 30759
httppeer: extract code for HTTP header spanning
A second consumer of HTTP header spanning will soon be introduced.
Factor out the code to do this so it can be reused.