Matt Harbison <matt_harbison@yahoo.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 23:13:51 -0500] rev 30772
revset: point to 'grep' in the 'keyword' help for regex searches
The help for 'grep' already points to 'keyword'.
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 23:13:00 -0800] rev 30771
help: explain that revsets can be used where 1 or 2 revs are wanted
We did not seem to document that one can do things like "hg up :@"
where the last revision of the revset ":@".
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 22:46:07 -0800] rev 30770
help: explain what the term "revset" means
We refer to revsets in a few places (e.g. in "hg help config"), but we
never explained what they are. Until now.
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:37:38 -0800] rev 30769
help: merge revsets.txt into revisions.txt
Selecting single and multiple revisions is closely related, so let's
put it in one place, so users can easily find it. We actually did not
even point to "hg help revsets" from "hg help revisions", but now that
they're on a single page, that won't be necessary.
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:40:40 -0800] rev 30768
tests: use `hg help dates` instead of `hg help revs` in test
The revisions help is already long and will get longer, so switch to
another short and stable topic.
Martin von Zweigbergk <martinvonz@google.com> [Wed, 11 Jan 2017 11:28:54 -0800] rev 30767
help: use a single paragraph to describe full and abbreviated nodeids
The texts describing 40-digit strings and the abbreviated form are
closely related, so make it a single paragraph.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 10 Jan 2017 23:37:08 -0800] rev 30766
hgweb: support Content Security Policy
Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a web security feature that allows
servers to declare what loaded content is allowed to do. For example,
a policy can prevent loading of images, JavaScript, CSS, etc unless
the source of that content is whitelisted (by hostname, URI scheme,
hashes of content, etc). It's a nifty security feature that provides
extra mitigation against some attacks, notably XSS.
Mitigation against these attacks is important for Mercurial because
hgweb renders repository data, which is commonly untrusted. While we
make attempts to escape things, etc, there's the possibility that
malicious data could be injected into the site content. If this happens
today, the full power of the web browser is available to that
malicious content. A restrictive CSP policy (defined by the server
operator and sent in an HTTP header which is outside the control of
malicious content), could restrict browser capabilities and mitigate
security problems posed by malicious data.
CSP works by emitting an HTTP header declaring the policy that browsers
should apply. Ideally, this header would be emitted by a layer above
Mercurial (likely the HTTP server doing the WSGI "proxying"). This
works for some CSP policies, but not all.
For example, policies to allow inline JavaScript may require setting
a "nonce" attribute on <script>. This attribute value must be unique
and non-guessable. And, the value must be present in the HTTP header
and the HTML body. This means that coordinating the value between
Mercurial and another HTTP server could be difficult: it is much
easier to generate and emit the nonce in a central location.
This commit introduces support for emitting a
Content-Security-Policy header from hgweb. A config option defines
the header value. If present, the header is emitted. A special
"%nonce%" syntax in the value triggers generation of a nonce and
inclusion in <script> elements in templates. The inclusion of a
nonce does not occur unless "%nonce%" is present. This makes this
commit completely backwards compatible and the feature opt-in.
The nonce is a type 4 UUID, which is the flavor that is randomly
generated. It has 122 random bits, which should be plenty to satisfy
the guarantees of a nonce.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Tue, 10 Jan 2017 20:47:48 -0800] rev 30765
hgweb: call process_dates() via DOM event listener
All the hgweb templates include mercurial.js in their header. All
the hgweb templates have the same <script> boilerplate to run
process_dates(). This patch factors that function call into
mercurial.js as part of a DOMContentLoaded event listener.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 15:29:32 -0700] rev 30764
protocol: send application/mercurial-0.2 responses to capable clients
With this commit, the HTTP transport now parses the X-HgProto-<N>
header to determine what media type and compression engine to use for
responses. So far, we only compress responses that are already being
compressed with zlib today (stream response types to specific
commands). We can expand things to cover additional response types
later.
The practical side-effect of this commit is that non-zlib compression
engines will be used if both ends support them. This means if both
ends have zstd support, zstd - not zlib - will be used to compress
data!
When cloning the mozilla-unified repository between a local HTTP
server and client, the benefits of non-zlib compression are quite
noticeable:
engine server CPU (s) client CPU (s) bundle size
zlib (l=6) 174.1 283.2 1,148,547,026
zstd (l=1) 99.2 267.3 1,127,513,841
zstd (l=3) 103.1 266.9 1,018,861,363
zstd (l=7) 128.3 269.7 919,190,278
zstd (l=10) 162.0 - 894,547,179
none 95.3 277.2 4,097,566,064
The default zstd compression level is 3. So if you deploy zstd
capable Mercurial to your clients and servers and CPU time on
your server is dominated by "getbundle" requests (clients cloning
and pulling) - and my experience at Mozilla tells me this is often
the case - this commit could drastically reduce your server-side
CPU usage *and* save on bandwidth costs!
Another benefit of this change is that server operators can install
*any* compression engine. While it isn't enabled by default, the
"none" compression engine can now be used to disable wire protocol
compression completely. Previously, commands like "getbundle" always
zlib compressed output, adding considerable overhead to generating
responses. If you are on a high speed network and your server is under
high load, it might be advantageous to trade bandwidth for CPU.
Although, zstd at level 1 doesn't use that much CPU, so I'm not
convinced that disabling compression wholesale is worthwhile. And, my
data seems to indicate a slow down on the client without compression.
I suspect this is due to a lack of buffering resulting in an increase
in socket read() calls and/or the fact we're transferring an extra 3 GB
of data (parsing HTTP chunked transfer and processing extra TCP packets
can add up). This is definitely worth investigating and optimizing. But
since the "none" compressor isn't enabled by default, I'm inclined to
punt on this issue.
This commit introduces tons of tests. Some of these should arguably
have been implemented on previous commits. But it was difficult to
test without the server functionality in place.
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 24 Dec 2016 15:22:18 -0700] rev 30763
httppeer: advertise and support application/mercurial-0.2
Now that servers expose a capability indicating they support
application/mercurial-0.2 and compression, clients can key off
this to say they support responses that are compressed with
various compression formats.
After this commit, the HTTP wire protocol client now sends an
"X-HgProto-<N>" request header indicating its support for
"application/mercurial-0.2" media type and various compression
formats.
This commit also implements support for handling
"application/mercurial-0.2" responses. It simply reads the header
compression engine identifier then routes the remainder of the
response to the appropriate decompressor.
There were some test changes, but only to logging. That points to
an obvious gap in our test coverage. This will be addressed in a
subsequent commit once server support is in place (it is hard to
test without server support).