Wed, 09 Mar 2016 19:55:45 +0000 debuginstall: expose modulepolicy
timeless <timeless@mozdev.org> [Wed, 09 Mar 2016 19:55:45 +0000] rev 29266
debuginstall: expose modulepolicy With this, you can check for pure easily: $ HGMODULEPOLICY=py ./hg debuginstall -T "{hgmodulepolicy}" py
Sat, 14 May 2016 19:52:00 +0900 revset: define table of sort() key functions
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Sat, 14 May 2016 19:52:00 +0900] rev 29265
revset: define table of sort() key functions This should be more readable than big "if" branch.
Sat, 14 May 2016 19:46:18 +0900 revset: factor out reverse flag of sort() key
Yuya Nishihara <yuya@tcha.org> [Sat, 14 May 2016 19:46:18 +0900] rev 29264
revset: factor out reverse flag of sort() key Prepares for making a table of sort keys. This assumes 'k' has at least one character, which should be guaranteed by keys.split().
Sat, 28 May 2016 12:29:59 -0700 tests: don't save host fingerprints in hgrc
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 28 May 2016 12:29:59 -0700] rev 29263
tests: don't save host fingerprints in hgrc Previously, the test saved the host fingerprints in hgrc. Many tests override the fingerprint at run-time. This was a bit dangerous and was too magical for my liking. It will also interfere with a future patch that adds a new source for obtaining fingerprints. So change the test to require the fingerprint on every command invocation.
Sat, 28 May 2016 11:58:28 -0700 sslutil: calculate host fingerprints from additional algorithms
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 28 May 2016 11:58:28 -0700] rev 29262
sslutil: calculate host fingerprints from additional algorithms Currently, we only support defining host fingerprints with SHA-1. A future patch will introduce support for defining fingerprints using other hashing algorithms. In preparation for that, we rewrite the fingerprint verification code to support multiple fingerprints, namely SHA-256 and SHA-512 fingerprints. We still only display the SHA-1 fingerprint. We'll have to revisit this code once we support defining fingerprints with other hash functions. As part of this, I snuck in a change to use range() instead of xrange() because xrange() isn't necessary for such small values.
Sat, 28 May 2016 12:57:28 -0700 util: add sha256
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 28 May 2016 12:57:28 -0700] rev 29261
util: add sha256 Upcoming patches will teach host fingerprint checking to verify non-SHA1 fingerprints. Many x509 certificates these days are SHA-256. And modern browsers often display the SHA-256 fingerprint for certificates. Since SHA-256 fingerprints are highly visible and easy to obtain, we want to support them for fingerprint pinning. So add SHA-256 support to util. I did not add SHA-256 to DIGESTS and DIGESTS_BY_STRENGTH because this will advertise the algorithm on the wire protocol. I wasn't sure if that would be appropriate. I'm playing it safe by leaving it out for now.
Sat, 28 May 2016 12:53:33 -0700 sslutil: move CA file processing into _hostsettings()
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 28 May 2016 12:53:33 -0700] rev 29260
sslutil: move CA file processing into _hostsettings() The CA file processing code has been moved from _determinecertoptions into _hostsettings(). As part of the move, the logic has been changed slightly and the "cacerts" variable has been renamed to "cafile" to match the argument used by SSLContext.load_verify_locations(). Since _determinecertoptions() no longer contains any meaningful code, it has been removed.
Sat, 28 May 2016 11:41:21 -0700 sslutil: move SSLContext.verify_mode value into _hostsettings
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 28 May 2016 11:41:21 -0700] rev 29259
sslutil: move SSLContext.verify_mode value into _hostsettings _determinecertoptions() and _hostsettings() are redundant with each other. _hostsettings() is used the flexible API we want. We start the process of removing _determinecertoptions() by moving some of the logic for the verify_mode value into _hostsettings(). As part of this, _determinecertoptions() now takes a settings dict as its argument. This is technically API incompatible. But since _determinecertoptions() came into existence a few days ago as part of this release, I'm not flagging it as such.
Sat, 28 May 2016 11:12:02 -0700 sslutil: introduce a function for determining host-specific settings
Gregory Szorc <gregory.szorc@gmail.com> [Sat, 28 May 2016 11:12:02 -0700] rev 29258
sslutil: introduce a function for determining host-specific settings This patch marks the beginning of a series that introduces a new, more configurable, per-host security settings mechanism. Currently, we have global settings (like web.cacerts and the --insecure argument). We also have per-host settings via [hostfingerprints]. Global security settings are good for defaults, but they don't provide the amount of control often wanted. For example, an organization may want to require a particular CA is used for a particular hostname. [hostfingerprints] is nice. But it currently assumes SHA-1. Furthermore, there is no obvious place to put additional per-host settings. Subsequent patches will be introducing new mechanisms for defining security settings, some on a per-host basis. This commits starts the transition to that world by introducing the _hostsettings function. It takes a ui and hostname and returns a dict of security settings. Currently, it limits itself to returning host fingerprint info. We foreshadow the future support of non-SHA1 hashing algorithms for verifying the host fingerprint by making the "certfingerprints" key a list of tuples instead of a list of hashes. We add this dict to the hgstate property on the socket and use it during socket validation for checking fingerprints. There should be no change in behavior.
Fri, 27 May 2016 15:20:03 -0700 tests-subrepo-git: emit a different "pwned" message based on the test stable 3.8.3
Danek Duvall <danek.duvall@oracle.com> [Fri, 27 May 2016 15:20:03 -0700] rev 29257
tests-subrepo-git: emit a different "pwned" message based on the test Having a single "pwned" message which may or may not be emitted during the tests for CVE-2016-3068 leads to extra confusion. Allow each test to emit a more detailed message based on what the expectations are. In both cases, we expect a version of git which has had the vulnerability plugged, as well as a version of mercurial which also knows about GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL. For the first test, we make sure GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL is unset, meaning that the ext-protocol subrepo should be ignored; if it isn't, there's either a problem with mercurial or the installed copy of git. For the second test, we explicitly allow ext-protocol subrepos, which means that the subrepo will be accessed and a message emitted confirming that this was, in fact, our intention.
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